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ABSTRACT
As information disclosure policies become a more popular and widespread regulatory tool, speakers
are increasingly challenging such policies as a violation of their freedom of speech. The First
Amendment limits on compelled commercial speech, however, have received little elaboration since
the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council. The new
challenges to information disclosure policies threaten to unsettle the compelled commercial speech
doctrine without appropriate recognition of the First Amendment values at stake, and to impose
significant limits on the state’s ability to compel the inclusion of factual information in
commercial speech in the service of the substantial state interests. While Zauderer indicates that
compelled commercial disclosures are subject to rational basis review, questions remain about what
interests can justify such disclosures, the types of disclosures that can be compelled, and what forms
of speech qualify as commercial speech. I conclude that compelled factual disclosures affecting
speech whose context and content is commercial should be subject to rational basis scrutiny as long
as (1) the disclosure serves the state’s interest in an informed public, and (2) the disclosure informs
the audience instead of spreading the government’s normative message. I will develop this
conclusion by looking to recent First Amendment challenges to (1) the FDA’s Final Rule requiring
tobacco packages and advertisements to include warning labels that have graphic images of the
consequences of tobacco addition, and (2) city laws requiring organizations providing services to
pregnant women to disclose the scope of their services. These recent legal challenges illustrate the
need for a new test for compelled commercial speech that adequately protects speakers’ First
Amendment rights, as well as the audience’s informational interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Government-compelled commercial speech is ubiquitous. The
government requires that cigarette and alcohol packaging display
health warnings, corporations file financial disclosure reports, new
cars’ showroom stickers include vehicles’ safety ratings, and food la1
bels display ingredients and nutritional content. These are but a few
examples of the ways in which the government requires private actors
to ‘speak’ in order to give the public more information about products and services in the commercial marketplace. Despite the prevalence and widespread acceptance of disclosure policies as an important regulatory tool, recent First Amendment challenges threaten
to impose significant limits on the state’s ability to compel commercial disclosures that serve substantial state goals.
The First Amendment “guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term
necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not
2
to say.” However, very little doctrine analyzes the First Amendment
implications of compelled commercial disclosures. Instead, the constitutionality of government-mandated commercial disclosures rests
on the Supreme Court’s twenty-seven-year-old decision in Zauderer v.
3
Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In Zauderer, the Court held that the state
can require commercial speech to include “purely factual and uncontroversial information” without violating the First Amendment “as
long as the [State’s] disclosure requirements are reasonably related
4
to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” Even
as mandated disclosures have become an increasingly popular form
1
2
3
4

See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM, & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 3–7 (2007).
Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
Id. at 651.

542

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:2

of government regulation, there has been little elaboration on the
scope of Zauderer’s holding.
One of the reasons that so little doctrine and academic writing
explores the First Amendment implications of compelled commercial
disclosures is because so few of these policies have actually been chal5
lenged in the courts on First Amendment grounds. In recent years,
however, a number of legal challenges to disclosure policies have
forced the lower courts to consider the scope and applicability of
Zauderer’s holding. Given these new legal challenges to compelled
disclosure policies, courts have the opportunity to clarify the questions left open by Zauderer and to articulate a coherent doctrine that
analyzes the First Amendment implications of government-mandated
commercial speech. With this opportunity, however, also comes the
danger that courts will either limit or expand Zauderer’s holding without recognizing the pertinent First Amendment values at stake.
There are three important questions facing the courts as they analyze First Amendment challenges to compelled factual disclosures.
First, the courts must decide whether disclosure policies that serve
state interests other than curing consumer deception qualify for Zauderer’s rational basis review. While some circuits have read Zauderer as
6
condoning disclosure policies that serve other valid state interests,
the D.C. Circuit recently limited Zauderer to disclosure policies curing
7
consumer deception. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to confront this question, and Zauderer’s language is less than clear. Second, the courts must evaluate what types of speech can be compelled under Zauderer by deciding when a disclosure ceases to provide
“purely factual and uncontroversial information,” and instead requires the speaker to recite a government message. Third, since Zauderer only applies to commercial speech, the courts must confront the
First Amendment doctrine’s confused definition of commercial
5

6

7

Justice Thomas noted the lack of clarity in the compelled commercial speech doctrine in
his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Borgner v. Florida Board of Dentistry, 537 U.S.
1080, 1082 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), when stating that:
“Our decisions have not presumptively endorsed government-scripted disclaimers or sufficiently clarified the nature and the quality of the evidence a State must present to show
that the challenged legislation directly advances the governmental interest asserted.” Id.
Most notably, the Second Circuit has adopted this expansive reading of Zauderer. See Nat’l
Elec. Mfg. Assoc. v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2nd Cir. 2001) (applying Zauderer to a disclosure policy designed to raise consumer awareness of the presence of mercury in certain products).
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *8 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 24, 2012) (“[B]y its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to cases in which
disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)).
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speech in deciding what types of speech can be required to include
factual disclosures. Courts must decide whether Zauderer’s rational
basis test should be strictly limited to laws that require disclosures in
the context of commercial transactions, and if not so limited, what
other types of speech fall within the definition of commercial speech.
This Article begins with an analysis of the current compelled
commercial speech doctrine and its underlying First Amendment
theories. I then address the three questions discussed above in order
to articulate a workable test for when disclosure requirements should
be subject to Zauderer’s rational basis review given the First Amendment interests at stake. Under my proposed test, compelled factual
disclosures affecting speech whose context and content is commercial
should be subject to rational basis scrutiny as long as: (1) the disclosure serves the state’s interest in an informed public, and (2) the disclosure informs the audience for the commercial speech instead of
spreading the government’s normative message.
First, I analyze whether Zauderer should apply to disclosures serving a broader range of state interests by looking to Zauderer’s reasoning itself, lower court doctrine addressing this question, and the policy reasons supporting a broad reading of the scope of state interests.
I conclude that Zauderer should apply to commercial disclosure laws
that serve the state’s interest in an informed public, even if the
speaker has not engaged in deceptive or misleading speech.
Second, in order to develop a better understanding of what
should qualify as a “factual” disclosure, I look to recent laws requiring
that tobacco products be accompanied by graphic warnings that provide visual depictions of the negative health consequences of smoking. I conclude that Zauderer does not apply when the government
compels normative speech that tells consumers how they should behave, and that for compelled visual disclosures, courts will need to
look to the government’s purpose for mandating the disclosure in
order to decide whether the graphic displays factual information or a
normative message. I conclude that the graphic tobacco warnings do
not merely display factual information because the government’s
purpose in mandating the warnings is not to inform consumers, but
rather to advance the government’s normative message “do not
smoke” through shock and disgust. While this conclusion does not
mean that the graphic warning law is per se unconstitutional, it does
mean that the law should be subject to more than rational basis scrutiny.
Third, given that Zauderer only applies to commercial speech, the
final section addresses how to determine whether a given speech act
qualifies as commercial speech. I analyze recent laws requiring facili-
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ties that provide women with pregnancy-related services to disclose
whether a medical provider is on staff and/or the scope of services
provided at the facility. Because these facilities often provide services
free-of-charge, lower federal courts have concluded that the facilities’
speech falls outside the commercial speech doctrine and that Zauderer, consequently, does not apply. However, I conclude that such a
narrow definition of commercial speech fails to appreciate that the
purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect the informational interests of the listener-audience, and that a more contextual,
multi-factor analysis is needed. From the perspective of the speech’s
audience, women who are or may be pregnant, these facilities are
service-providers competing with other market participants that provide pregnancy-related services. While Zauderer should not be applied
8
to ideological speech that forms part of the public discourse, I conclude that compelled disclosures applied to speech whose context
and content is of a commercial nature should be subject to rational
basis review, regardless of whether the speaker has an economic motivation for engaging in the speech.
As courts consider the proper scope of Zauderer in a variety of factual contexts, there is the possibility that the doctrine may become
even more confused. By taking a step back and evaluating Zauderer’s
scope in light of the origins and purposes of the compelled commercial speech doctrine, this Article will articulate a coherent test that
both recognizes the First Amendment values at stake while also giving
appropriate weight to the substantial interests served by such disclosure policies.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON COMPELLED SPEECH: THE
ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s compelled speech doctrine began with the
9
1943 case West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. This case
“is seen as enshrining the principle of First Amendment protection
10
against compelled speech.” In Barnette, a family of Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged the West Virginia State Board of Education’s re8

9
10

For example, lesser scrutiny would not apply if the state passed a law requiring disclosures
to be given during religious sermons. This type of law would impermissibly interfere with
ideological speech. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
(“[W]here . . . the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we
cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase.”).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 847, 851 (2011).
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quirement that all schoolchildren begin the school day by reciting
the pledge of allegiance and saluting the American flag. Students
who refused to participate in this compulsory ceremony were ex11
pelled, and their parents faced criminal prosecution. The Court
struck down this requirement as interfering with “the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
12
Constitution to reserve from all official control.” The Court justified
its conclusion that the First Amendment prohibited this form of
compelled speech by pointing to the Amendment’s applicability to
restrictions on speech—to uphold the compelled pledge and salute
would mean that “a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right
to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel
13
him to utter what is not in his mind.” The Court rejected such a
narrow reading of the First Amendment and made the following oftcited pronouncement: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith there14
in.” The compelled speech doctrine’s origins can be traced back to
Barnette’s prohibition on mandating private individuals to engage in
15
“public declarations of ideological positions.”
The Court extended Barnette’s reasoning in the 1977 case Wooley v.
16
Maynard. In Wooley, the plaintiff, who was also a follower of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, sought to invalidate New Hampshire’s requirement that all noncommercial vehicles bear a license plate embossed with the state’s motto: “Live Free or Die.” The plaintiff
argued that the state law coerced him into “advertising a slogan
17
which I find morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent.”
The Court, citing Barnette, began with a broad pronouncement about
the First Amendment’s protection against compelled speech:
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to
foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 642.
Stern, supra note 10, at 900.
430 U.S. 705, 706 (1977).
Id. at 713 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of “in18
dividual freedom of mind.”

While recognizing that Barnette “involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state
19
motto on a license plate,” the Court overturned New Hampshire’s
license plate law after concluding that the difference was merely a
matter of degree. In both cases, the Court was “faced with a state
measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point
20
of view he finds unacceptable.”
A. Distinguishing Compelled Commercial Speech
Despite the Court’s broad pronouncements about the First
Amendment’s protection against compelled speech, Zauderer reduces
the level of scrutiny for compulsory factual disclosure laws targeting
commercial speech. In Zauderer, an Ohio attorney challenged the
state’s rule requiring advertisements offering legal services on a contingency-fee basis to include a statement indicating whether a client is
21
liable for costs if his claim is unsuccessful. The Court first noted the
“material differences between disclosure requirements and outright
22
prohibitions on speech.” While recognizing prior holdings that “in
some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First
Amendment as prohibitions on speech,” the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Ohio’s rule imposed compelled speech of the
type considered in Barnette and Wooley because “the interests at stake
23
in this case are not of the same order.” Instead of forcing Ohio attorneys to express the state’s ideological position, the State “has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement
that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services will be
24
available.”
The Court’s analysis in Zauderer was directly tied to its classification of the type of speech that was affected by Ohio’s law. Attorney
advertisements qualified as commercial speech, a type of speech that
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 714 (citations omitted) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
Id. at 715.
Id.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 651.
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received little, if any, First Amendment protection until the Court’s
1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
25
Consumer Council, Inc. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists from
advertising the prices of prescription drugs. The Court was confronted squarely with the question of whether commercial speech, described in Virginia Pharmacy as “speech which does no more than
26
propose a commercial transaction,” was devoid of First Amendment
protection. Noting that an individual’s economic motivation for
speaking does not “disqualif[y] him from protection under the First
27
Amendment,” and that a “consumer’s interest in the free flow of
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far,
28
than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate,” the
Court extended the First Amendment’s protections to commercial
speech. In doing so, the Court recognized that society’s interest in
the free flow of commercial information serves the First Amendment’s goal of “enlighten[ed] public decisionmaking in a democra29
cy.”
The Court recognized, however, that commercial speech warrants
“a different degree of protection” than other speech, and, foreshadowing Zauderer, noted that it may be “appropriate to require that a
commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to pre30
vent its being deceptive.” The Court later clarified in another seminal commercial speech decision, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
31
Public Service Commission of New York, that “[t]he protection available
for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regula-

25

26
27
28
29
30
31

425 U.S. 748 (1976). While the Court had not squarely held that commercial speech received no First Amendment protection, cases before Virginia Pharmacy strongly suggested
such a result. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1951) (upholding
conviction of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door magazine subscription solicitation and
distinguishing religious solicitation, which involves “no element of the commercial”);
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that while the First Amendment would prohibit the State from banning handbills in public spaces, it imposes “no
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising”).
425 U.S. at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 771 n.24.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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32

tion.” The Central Hudson Court outlined a four-part test for analyzing commercial speech regulations:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next,
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it
33
is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

It was against the backdrop of the new, and yet reduced, level of
protection for commercial speech that Zauderer was decided. The
Court cites to Virginia Pharmacy in recognizing that “[b]ecause the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is min34
imal.” And instead of applying Central Hudson’s four-part test, the
Court adopts rational basis review, recognizing that:
[I]n virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than do flat prohibitions on speech,
“warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required . . . in or35
der to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception.”

The Court holds that a compelled disclosure law imposed on commercial speech is constitutional so long as it is “reasonably related to
36
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” While
the Court places a limit on disclosures by cautioning that “unjustified
or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the
37
First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech,” the
Court’s language suggests that the only First Amendment interest
implicated by compelled commercial disclosures of purely factual information is the potential that the disclosure will prevent the speaker
from engaging in protected, truthful commercial speech.
B. Compelled Factual Disclosures in Public Discourse
As this Article makes clear, Zauderer leaves open many questions
about the applicability of its rational basis test to other types of factual
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 563.
Id. at 566.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (citation omitted).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
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disclosure laws. Very soon after Zauderer, however, the Court was presented with an opportunity to clarify the First Amendment implications of factual disclosure laws that interfere with fully-protected
38
speech. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.
includes broad language indicating that compelled factual disclosures
are impermissible outside of the commercial speech context:
“[t]here is certainly some difference between compelled speech and
compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment
guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the
39
decision of both what to say and what not to say.” While there has
40
been much criticism of the Court’s broad language, given that the
Court’s reasoning was closely tied to the effect of Riley’s factual disclo41
sure on fully-protected, ideological speech, it is possible to read Riley
as suggesting that full First Amendment protection applies to factual
disclosures imposed on any speech that does not qualify as “commer42
cial speech” under the Court’s precedents.
38
39
40

41

42

!

487 U.S. 781 (1988).
Id. at 796–97.
See David W. Ogden, Is There a First Amendment “Right to Remain Silent”?: The Supreme
Court’s “compelled speech” doctrine, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368, 370–71 (1993) (discussing how
Riley’s language “appears to be overbroad” and goes “far beyond the prior case law”).
In Riley, the Court considered a North Carolina law requiring professional fundraisers
soliciting charitable donations to disclose the percentage of the donation that they would
retain as their fee. The Court concluded that the commercial speech doctrine did not
apply because the commercial elements of the speech were “inextricably intertwined”
with the fundraisers’ ideological advocacy. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. Although the fundraisers were assuredly soliciting money, the Court was concerned with “the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech”
and that “without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely
cease.” Id. Thus, it is important to read the language in Riley in light of the Court’s concern about the effect that the disclosure would have on the fundraisers’ ideological, and
thus fully-protected, speech—the Court was very concerned with the possibility that the
disclosure would “hamper the legitimate efforts of professional fundraisers to raise money for the charities they represent.” Id. at 799. The disclosure would make solicitation
more difficult, as potential donors would be less likely to give funds if informed that the
fundraiser was retaining a high percentage of the donation. The Court believed that the
disclosure would thereby make it more difficult for charities, particularly smaller and
more unpopular charities, to engage in their ideological advocacy. Id. at 799–800.
But see Stern, supra note 10, at 914–15 (discussing Riley and concluding that “negative
speech rights appear to draw strength largely from combination with separate constitutionally cognizable interests”). Moreover, it is worth noting that, alongside its broad language, Riley also suggests that more limited factual disclosures are permissible under the
First Amendment, even when imposed on fully-protected speech. For example, the Court
speaks favorably of an unchallenged provision of the law requiring the fundraisers to disclose their professional status to potential donors, and explicitly cautions that “nothing in
this opinion should be taken to suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his or her professional status.” Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11. The
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Though this Article will focus on the scope of Zauderer, the Court’s
language in Riley serves as an important reminder of the constitutional stakes of extending complete First Amendment protection to compelled factual disclosures, and the significance of the boundary between commercial and non-commercial speech. If Riley applied to
disclosures in commercial speech, the government would be severely
restricted in its ability to compel factual disclosures. The importance
of articulating a coherent definition of commercial speech becomes
all the more clear when one considers the alternative strict First
Amendment scrutiny presented by a broad reading of Riley.
II. THEORIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FACTUAL DISCLOSURES
IMPOSED ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH SERVE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
Now that I have provided a brief overview of the state of the compelled speech doctrine, it is worth exploring the theoretical justifications underlying the Court’s decision to give lesser scrutiny to regulations compelling factual commercial speech. The First Amendment
theories supporting Zauderer help to illustrate the values at stake in
deciding whether and how to extend Zauderer to new types of disclosure laws.
A. Marketplace of Ideas and Democratic Self-Governance
The concept of the First Amendment as protecting a “marketplace
of ideas” in which robust debate will ultimately lead to discovery of
truth was injected into Supreme Court jurisprudence by Justice
43
Holmes in his 1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States. Rooted in the
philosophies of John Milton and John Stuart Mill, the “marketplace
of ideas” has come to be viewed as “essential to effective popular participation in government . . . [since] the quality of the public exchange of ideas promoted by the marketplace advances the quality of
44
democratic government.” The values underlying the marketplace of
ideas theory of the First Amendment have been cited by the Court in

43
44

Court’s recent application of less than strict scrutiny to disclosure requirements imposed
on political speech, a form of speech that is at the core of the First Amendment’s protections, suggests that some of Riley’s language goes too far. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010) (“[D]isclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech.”).
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 3–4 (1984).
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45

a wide variety of opinions, making clear that “more speech and a
better informed citizenry are among the central goals of the Free
46
Speech Clause.” As Justice Kennedy recently observed in his plurali47
ty opinion in United States v. Alvarez, the marketplace of ideas theory
of the First Amendment dictates that “[t]he remedy for speech that is
48
false is speech that is true.” When false speech is injected into the
marketplace of ideas, robust debate will ensure that the truth will ultimately prevail.
Under this theory, factual disclosure laws, which inject more information in the marketplace of ideas, further First Amendment
49
goals. In fact, “it is often the very purpose of ‘compelled speech’ requirements to correct market flaws in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ and
further the First Amendment’s goal of maximizing communication
50
and discovery of truth.” Compelled speech requirements merely
enhance the information that is being circulated, thus contributing
to and improving the marketplace of ideas by providing citizens with
more information than would otherwise be available.
A related theory of the First Amendment focuses on the Amendment’s ultimate goal: a better informed citizenry that can make wise
voting decisions, thus ensuring the success of democratic selfgovernment. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, who focused on the

45

46
47
48
49

50

See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (plurality opinion) (describing Justice Holmes’ quote from Abrams as “the theory of our Constitution,” and concluding that our “[s]ociety has the right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (“Our precedents have
focused not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual selfexpression but also on its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and
the dissemination of information and ideas.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (“The Court has
long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace for the clash of different
views and conflicting ideas. That concept has been stated and restated almost since the
Constitution was drafted.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”).
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
Id. at 2550.
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
Ogden, supra note 40, at 370. But see Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech
Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 333 (2008) (arguing that compelled speech means the government “artificially amplifies its own message through the mouths of unwilling citizens,
giving listeners a mix of information skewed to the government viewpoint” and thus distorts the marketplace of ideas).
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social values served by free speech, championed the “democratic selfgovernment” theory of the First Amendment. In his view:
Legislation which abridges . . . freedom [of speech] is forbidden, but not
legislation to enlarge and enrich it. The freedom of mind which befits
the members of a self-governing society is not a given and fixed part of
human nature. It can be increased and established by learning, by teaching, by the unhindered flow of accurate information . . . . And the federal legislature is not forbidden to engage in that positive enterprise of cultivating the general intelligence upon which the success of self51
government so obviously depends.

For Meiklejohn, and other proponents of the democratic selfgovernment theory, “the ‘best’ decisions can only be reached in a
democracy if the citizenry is fully aware of the issues involved, the op52
tions available, and the interests or values affected.” As a consequence, this theory of the First Amendment focuses “on the rights of
citizens to receive information, rather than on the rights of speakers
53
to express themselves.”
Just as compelled factual disclosures contribute to the marketplace of ideas and the search for truth, compelled disclosures also
further the goal of democratic self-government. Since an uninformed citizenry poses a risk to citizenship and participation in a deliberative democracy, compelled factual disclosures further First
Amendment goals. As Professor Cass Sunstein argues, “[w]ithout better information, neither deliberation nor democracy is possible. Legal reforms designed to remedy the situation are a precondition for
54
democratic politics.” Such reforms are particularly necessary when
there is a market failure in the provision of information, demonstrating that citizens will remain uninformed unless the government intervenes. Since information is a public good with non-rival consumption, “private incentives lead to the dissemination of too little
55
information.” In particular, information about risk and harm is often underproduced, necessitating some type of government interven-

51

52
53
54
55

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 16–17
(1948); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1948) (“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but
that everything worth saying shall be said.”).
Ingber, supra note 44, at 9.
Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2000)
[hereinafter Post, The Constitutional Status of Commerical Speech].
Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 653, 658 (1993).
FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.
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tion to require its disclosure if the public is to be adequately in56
formed.
B. Autonomy Interests
If the First Amendment were only governed by the marketplace of
ideas and democratic self-governance theories, non-commercial
speakers might also be compelled to speak in ways that enhance the
informational value of their speech. After all, one could argue that
the marketplace and democratic self-governance would be benefited
if the government required factual disclosures that improved the
quality of all speech, even ideological or political speech. The important distinction, however, is that the First Amendment also provides robust protection for the autonomy interests of non-commercial
speakers. As the Court articulated in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Les57
bian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., the First Amendment protects
against compelling speech in public discourse because of the “fundamental rule . . . that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the con58
tent of his own message.” If the state were to impose its view of what
qualifies as “the truth” on religious or political speech, this would
59
undermine democratic legitimation. We tolerate false ideas in the
public discourse because the First Amendment protects the right of
self-expression: “Such falsehoods are tolerated because we are freer
as a society when individuals are permitted to engage in unhindered
60
self-expression.” Freedom of speech entails more than just increasing the amount of true information in the marketplace; freedom of
speech also secures the rights of individuals to express their own beliefs, no matter their truth, without fear of government censorship.
The Court has made clear that at the “‘heart of the First Amendment
56

57
58
59
60

See id. at 6 (“A generation of research by economists and political scientists has shown that
markets and deliberative processes do not automatically produce all the information
people need to make informed choices among goods and services. When hidden risks or
service flaws create serious problems for the public at large, the government can help reduce those risks or improve services by stepping in to require the disclosure of missing information.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 656 (“[T]here is frequently a market failure in the provision of information. At least as a presumptive matter, government
remedies are an appropriate response. These remedies should ordinarily take the form
of governmentally provided information, education campaigns, or disclosure requirements imposed on private firms.”).
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Id. at 573.
See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59 (2012) [hereinafter POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM].
Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 257
(1990).
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[is the] notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will,
and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind
61
and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.’” Thus, compelling speakers to include even purely factual information in their
non-commercial speech threatens the speaker’s constitutionally protected autonomy interests.
In contrast, the First Amendment provides minimal protection for
the autonomy interests of a speaker who is engaged in commercial
speech. Such speakers do not engage in a form of self-expression
when they provide the public with information about their products
and services. “Since the advertiser is not engaged in an expression of
its views or any other revelation of its personality, forcing the advertisement to carry a message not its own does not violate the integrity
of the expressive, thinking self as did the regulations struck down in
62
Barnette, and Wooley.” The First Amendment protects commercial
speech because of its informational value to consumers, not because
the commercial speaker has a right to promote his products in whatever manner he sees fit. “[W]hereas ordinary First Amendment doctrine preserves the freedom of a speaker to participate in public discourse in the manner of her choosing, commercial speech doctrine
focuses instead on preserving the flow of commercial information to
63
the public.” The Court’s most recent application of Zauderer illus64
trates this distinction: in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States,
the plaintiff objected to the disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. In rejecting the
plaintiff’s challenge to the Act’s requirement that advertisements for
bankruptcy assistance include the term “debt relief agency,” the
Court characterized its argument that the term was confusing as
“amount[ing] to little more than [the plaintiff’s] preference . . . for
referring to itself as something other than a ‘debt relief agen65
cy’ . . . . [T]his preference lacks any constitutional basis.” Given that
the Act only restricted the plaintiff’s commercial speech, it lacked any
autonomy interest in defining itself by some other label.
61
62
63

64
65

Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997) (quoting Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977)).
Estreicher, supra note 60, at 271 n.200 (citations omitted).
Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 975 (2007) [hereinafter Post, Informed Consent to Abortion];
see also Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 27 (“Disclosure
requirements are permissible within the domain of commercial speech, however, because
the autonomy of speakers is not at stake, only the conveyance of information.”).
130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
Id. at 1340.
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C. Applying First Amendment Theories to Compelled Commercial Speech
The Court has drawn on the marketplace of ideas and democratic
self-government theories of the First Amendment in extending the
Amendment’s protection to commercial speech. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court described “free flow of information,” even information
on commercial subjects, as serving the First Amendment’s goal of
66
“enlighten[ed] public decisionmaking in a democracy.” Dean Robert Post has described the Court’s analysis in Virginia Pharmacy as
67
“closely track[ing] Meiklejohn’s analysis” of the societal values
served by free speech: “The Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech should be constitutionally protected so as to safe68
guard the circulation of information.” And the Court continues to
justify the First Amendment’s protection for commercial speech
69
based on the audience’s informational interests.
Since commercial speech is protected mainly for its informational
function, compelled factual disclosures that merely enhance the
amount and quality of information being circulated align with the
reason commercial speech is protected at all. “[B]ecause commercial
speech is not protected in order to promote democratic legitimation,
but instead to serve democratic competence, it is constitutionally
permissible to compel commercial speech. Such compulsion can
augment the flow of accurate information to the public and so actual70
ly advance the constitutional purpose of public education.” The
Court was quite explicit that this was its rationale in upholding Zauderer’s disclosure requirement, reasoning that since protection of
commercial speech is “justified principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides,” Zauderer’s First Amendment interest “in not providing any particular factual information in

66
67
68
69

70

Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 14.
Id.
See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340–41 (upholding a commercial speech disclosure law that
“provides interested observers with pertinent information about the advertiser’s services
and client obligations”); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993) (“First Amendment
coverage of commercial speech is designed to safeguard” society’s “interests in broad access to complete and accurate commercial information . . . .”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (noting that commercial advertisement is protected
“because it furthers the societal interest in the free flow of commercial information” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)
(noting that commercial “speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking”).
POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 59, at 42 (footnote
omitted).
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71

his advertising is minimal.” The compelled disclosure had minimal
72
impact on Zauderer’s autonomy —the regulation merely required
him to provide additional factual information that he otherwise
would not have disclosed.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE STATE INTERESTS JUSTIFYING COMMERCIAL
DISCLOSURE LAWS
Zauderer’s language is unclear whether its rational basis test applies
if the state’s interest in mandating the commercial disclosure is something other than curing consumer deception. The Court’s explicit
holding is as follows: “[W]e hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consum73
ers.” While this language could be read as limiting the scope of
74
state interests justifying commercial disclosure laws, the Court may
have simply been recognizing that the state’s purpose in enacting the
law at issue in Zauderer was to cure consumer deception. The Court’s
later applications of Zauderer have not clarified the confusion over
what types of interests can justify compelled commercial speech. In
75
the 2010 case Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, the Court upheld a commercial disclosure law under Zauderer, but since the law’s purpose was
also to cure consumer deception, there was no need for the Court to
address whether other types of state interests can justify compelled
76
commercial disclosures.
However, a close reading of Zauderer suggests that compelled
commercial speech should be subject to rational basis scrutiny even if
other interests motivated the state regulation. The Court’s lack of
any extensive discussion of Central Hudson’s more restrictive test sug-

71
72

73
74

75
76

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
See, e.g., Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555,
562 (2006) [hereinafter Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets] (“The Court would surely
not characterize as ‘minimal’ the constitutional interests of participants in public discourse, like the New York Times, to refuse to publish accurate factual information to supplement what the government might regard as a potentially misleading editorial.”).
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Zauderer carries no authority for a mandate unrelated to the interest in
avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial messages.”).
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340–41 (2010).
See also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001) (distinguishing Zauderer on the grounds that Zauderer’s disclosure was required to cure consumer deception,
but not holding that this is the only state interest justifying compelled disclosures).
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gests that its rationale for applying lesser scrutiny to compelled commercial speech lay in the difference between compelling additional
factual speech and restricting speech, not on the particular state interest motivating the disclosure under consideration. Importantly,
under Central Hudson, misleading commercial speech can be banned
by the state—such speech is not even protected by the First Amend77
ment, and Central Hudson’s requirements consequently do not apply.
Given the Zauderer Court’s conclusion that the attorney advertisements were deceptive and misleading because of their omission of
any information about the client’s liability for costs, the Court could
have simply concluded that since deceptive commercial speech is not
even protected under Central Hudson, the state could compel additional factual speech that cures this deception without violating the
First Amendment. If the key consideration justifying the application
of rational basis scrutiny was the misleading nature of the underlying
speech, the Court surely would have mentioned Central Hudson’s
holding that misleading commercial speech lies outside the First
Amendment.
The Court did not take this route—instead, the Court focuses on
the “material differences between disclosure requirements and out78
right prohibitions on speech.” The Court notes its strong preference for disclosure laws as a general method of regulating commercial speech: “[A]ll our discussions of restraints on commercial
speech have recommended disclosure requirements as one of the ac79
ceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of speech.”
And the Court rejects Zauderer’s argument that compelled commercial speech should be subject to a “least restrictive means” test under
Central Hudson “[b]ecause the First Amendment interests implicated
by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at
80
stake when speech is actually suppressed.” The reason that Central
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny did not apply was not because the particular speech at issue was misleading and deceptive—it was because
the state was compelling the inclusion of additional, factual information in commercial speech, and “appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in
81
his advertising is minimal.” Dean Post has also read Zauderer as condoning disclosure policies serving a wider range of state interests,
77
78
79
80
81

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 651 n.14.
Id.
Id. at 651.
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noting that the Court does not minimize a commercial speaker’s First
Amendment interests because of the state’s “powerful interest in
averting potential deception. Instead [the Court] held that because
the constitutional value of commercial speech lies in the circulation
of information, commercial speakers do not possess more than residual interests in deciding what kinds of advertisements to promul82
gate.”
If we look to the Court’s analysis of regulations that restrict commercial speech, rather than simply compelling disclosures, the Court
has made clear that other valid interests justify restrictions on com83
mercial speech. As just a few examples, the Court has recognized
84
the state’s interest in protecting the reputation of attorneys, dis85
couraging participation in lotteries, and reducing alcoholism by
86
preventing strength wars between alcohol producers as valid state
interests under Central Hudson. Thus, while prevention of commercial harm may be “the typical reason why commercial speech can be
subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial
87
speech,” it is not the only reason. And if commercial speech can be
restricted for purposes other than the prevention of consumer deception and confusion, it would make little sense to limit the state’s interests when the form of regulation raises fewer First Amendment
concerns.
Rather than listing the various ultimate goals besides curing consumer deception that should qualify for rational basis review, the test
can in fact be reduced to a much simpler inquiry into the state’s immediate purpose in compelling the speech. Whether the state’s ultimate goal is to encourage healthier eating habits or to discourage use
of a dangerous product, if the state’s immediate purpose is to inform
consumers, the disclosure law furthers the goals of the commercial
speech doctrine by increasing consumers’ access to information
without offending the speaker’s autonomy interests. Accordingly,
82

83

84
85
86
87

Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets, supra note 72, at 577; see also Jennifer L. Pomeranz,
Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 178 (2009) (arguing that a narrow reading of Zauderer as
permitting only disclosure laws that serve the state’s interest in curing deception is both
“incorrect” and “unfeasible”).
Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 784 (1999) (“The Central Hudson standard . . . does
not limit the justifications for restrictions on commercial speech to the prevention of deception.”).
Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 437 (1993).
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995).
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993).
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Zauderer’s rational basis scrutiny should apply whenever the state
compels commercial disclosures that serve the state’s interest in an
informed public.
A. Lower Court Interpretations of the State’s Interest in Compelling
Commercial Speech
In fact, both the Second and First Circuits have read Zauderer as
permitting compelled commercial speech that serves interests other
than curing consumer deception. In Pharmaceutical Care Management
88
Ass’n v. Rowe, the First Circuit applied Zauderer to Maine’s requirement that middlemen in the distribution of pharmaceuticals disclose
information about their finances and business practices to the state,
rejecting the argument that Zauderer is limited to curing deceptive
89
commercial advertising.
And in National Electrical Manufacturers
90
Ass’n v. Sorrell, the Second Circuit held that commercial disclosure
laws satisfy the First Amendment as long as there is a “rational connection between the purpose of a commercial disclosure requirement
91
and the means employed to realize that purpose.” Since Sorrell provides a thorough analysis of the reason for permitting disclosures that
serve other state interests, it is worth considering this decision in
some detail.
In Sorrell, the Second Circuit evaluated a Vermont law requiring
producers of products containing mercury to label their products to
inform consumers that the products contained mercury and should
be recycled or disposed of as hazardous waste, in accordance with a
separate Vermont statute requiring these products to be recycled or
92
disposed of as such. The court recognized that the disclosure law
“was not intended to prevent consumer confusion or deception per
se, but rather to better inform consumers about the products they
93
purchase.” But the court concluded that Zauderer’s rational basis
test still applied: “Vermont’s interest in protecting human health and
the environment from mercury poisoning [was] a legitimate and sig94
nificant public goal,” that was reasonably related to the state’s disclosure requirement.

88
89
90
91
92
93
94

429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 310 n.8.
272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 107 n.1.
Id. at 115 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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The Second Circuit’s rationale for reading Zauderer broadly was
tied to its recognition of the First Amendment interests at stake:
Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core First
Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or
protecting individual liberty interests. Such disclosure furthers, rather
than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and
contributes to the efficiency of the “marketplace of ideas.” Protection of
the robust and free flow of accurate information is the principal First
Amendment justification for protecting commercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that goal. In such a case,
then, less exacting scrutiny is required than where truthful, nonmislead95
ing commercial speech is restricted.

The court recognized that Zauderer’s reduced level of scrutiny had
little to do with the particular state interest served by the disclosure at
issue in that case. Instead, the rationale was much broader: mandated factual information increases the amount of accurate information
circulated in the marketplace, without offending any autonomy interests.
When the Second Circuit was subsequently confronted with a
challenge to New York City’s law requiring certain restaurants to disclose on their menu and menu boards the number of calories in each
dish, the court reiterated the validity of Sorrell’s broad reading of the
state interests justifying compelled commercial speech. The court
upheld New York City’s menu-labeling regime, recognizing the applicability of Zauderer given the state’s compelling interest in combat96
ting the public health crisis of obesity. The Second Circuit’s decision in New York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health
further illustrates the rationale behind extending Zauderer to laws that
serve valid state purposes beyond curing consumer deception.
The clear ultimate goal of New York City’s menu disclosure law
was to promote public health. The City’s Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene described the law’s purpose as permitting “individuals to make more informed choices that can decrease their risk for
the negative health effects of overweight and obesity associated with
97
excessive calorie intake.” The evidence relied upon by the City in
New York Restaurant Ass’n demonstrated that 54% of the City’s adults
95
96
97

Id. at 113–14 (footnote omitted).
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 136 (2d Cir. 2009).
DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF AN
AMENDMENT (§ 81.50) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE (Dec. 5,
2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/noticeadoption-hc-art81-50.pdf.
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and 43% of the City’s elementary school children were either overweight or obese, and that obesity was a contributing factor to the dis98
eases that caused 70% of deaths in New York City in 2005. The evidence also demonstrated that individuals often consume an excess of
calories when dining outside the home, and that excess calorie con99
sumption was the main cause of the obesity epidemic.
In upholding New York City’s law, the Second Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that Zauderer should be limited to disclosure re100
quirements that cure deceptive and misleading speech.
Reaffirm101
ing the validity of Sorrell, the court reiterated “that Zauderer’s holding was broad enough to encompass nonmisleading disclosure
102
In so doing, the court rejected the argument that
requirements.”
the Supreme Court’s post-Sorrell decision in United States v. United
103
Foods, Inc. had in any way limited the types of disclosure laws subject
to rational basis review under Zauderer. The Second Circuit concluded that United Foods had merely “distinguishe[d] Zauderer on the basis
that the compelled speech in Zauderer was necessary to prevent deception of consumers; it does not provide that all other disclosure re104
quirements are subject to heightened scrutiny.” The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that more recent Supreme Court
decisions recognizing the general value of commercial speech meant
that Central Hudson’s test, rather than rational basis scrutiny under
Zauderer, should be applied to compelled commercial speech regula105
tions.
In explaining why commercial disclosure requirements are subject
to lesser scrutiny, the court quoted extensively from Sorrell’s recognition of the pertinent First Amendment values at stake. The court
made clear that “laws mandating factual disclosures are subject to the
98
99
100

101
102
103
104
105

N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 134–35.
Id. at 135.
During the litigation, the city asserted that it had two purposes for enacting the law: “(1)
[to] reduce consumer confusion and deception; and (2) to promote informed consumer
decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associated with it.” Id. at 134.
The court, however, did not address this first purpose in light of its holding that the city’s
public health rationale provided sufficient justification for the law. See id. at 133 n.21.
The city’s attempted re-characterization of its interest as reducing deception and confusion for the purposes of the litigation shows how many disclosure laws can fit within a
narrow reading of Zauderer, even though the real state interest is broader than curing deception.
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133.
533 U.S. 405 (2001).
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133.
See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 45–46, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114 (No. 08-1892cv).
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rational basis test even if they address non-deceptive speech.” Given the findings that consumers would be able to make more informed and healthier food choices if given calorie information, the
court concluded that the City’s menu disclosure law was “clearly rea107
sonably related to its goal of reducing obesity.”
The D.C. Circuit, however, has taken the contrary view. The D.C.
Circuit recently adopted a restricted view of the breadth of state interests justifying commercial disclosures, holding that Zauderer’s rational basis test is in fact limited to disclosure laws curing consumer
108
deception. The majority reasons that Zauderer does not provide any
explicit authority for disclosures serving other state interests, and that
subsequent Supreme Court cases have not endorsed broader applica109
tions of Zauderer’s rational basis review.
In contrast to the Second
Circuit’s extensive analysis of the First Amendment values implicated
by commercial disclosures, the D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion provides no First Amendment rationale for limiting Zauderer’s holding to
laws curing consumer deception. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit is the
only circuit that has adopted such a narrow view of Zauderer’s applica110
bility.
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether commercial disclosure laws serving state interests other than curing consumer deception should be subject to rational basis review. Given the circuit
split, the Court may very well address this question in the near future.
111
The Second Circuit’s reasoning on this point demonstrates the lack
of any First Amendment rationale for limiting Zauderer to laws curing
consumer deception, and the importance of recognizing other valid
112
state interests justifying compelled commercial speech. As long as
the state has a substantial interest in informing the public, rational
106
107
108
109
110

111
112

N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133 n.21.
Id. at 136.
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *5–6
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).
Id.
In addition, it is worth noting that Judge Rogers questions the majority’s analysis on this
point in her dissent, noting that “[a]s other circuits have recognized, in Zauderer the Supreme Court appears simply to have held that a government interest in protecting consumers from possible deception is sufficient to support a disclosure requirement—not that
this particular interest is necessary to support such a requirement.” Id. at *16 n.6 (Rogers,
J., dissenting). Judge Rogers ultimately does not reach a conclusion on this point, as she
finds that the law at issue cures consumer deception and confusion. Id.
It is worth noting that Justice Sotomayor was on the Second Circuit panel in both Sorrell
and New York State Restaurant Ass’n before her elevation to the Supreme Court.
For instance, looking to N.Y. State Restaurant Ass’n, the state’s important efforts to combat
a serious public health crisis would have been subject to a higher level of scrutiny if Zauderer were limited to disclosures curing deception and confusion.
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basis scrutiny should apply, regardless of whether the state’s ultimate
goal is to cure deception, to promote public health, or to protect the
environment.
B. The Prevalence of Disclosures Serving the State’s Interest in an Informed
Public
If Zauderer were limited to disclosure laws curing consumer deception and confusion, a wide variety of disclosure policies would be subject to searching judicial review. Innumerable laws and regulations
compel commercial disclosures for reasons other than curing decep113
tion. And given the current support for information disclosure pol114
icies as an important regulatory tool to improve decision-making,
the number of such laws is very likely to increase. Thus, while there
are arguments based on case law that support a broad reading of the
state interests justifying compelled disclosures, there is also an independent policy argument supporting this interpretation.
The government mandates commercial disclosures that serve a
wide range of interests other than curing consumer deception. These laws serve the state’s interest in protecting the environment, promoting public health, and reducing safety risks posed by hazardous
products and behaviors, to name just a few of the most common goals
motivating compelled disclosures. Packaged food products must in115
clude nutritional data and information about the presence of
116
common allergens, hazardous substances must be labeled with their
117
safety risks, tobacco products and advertisements must be labeled
118
with health risks, appliances must be labeled with their energy con119
sumption levels, pesticides must be labeled with their ingredients
120
and directions for proper use, alcoholic beverages must be labeled
121
with information about safety and health risks, restaurants must dis-

113

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

See Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets, supra note 72, at 584 (“[C]ommercial speech is
routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that have little to do with the prevention
of deception.”).
See Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 § 4 (Jan. 18, 2011).
21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006) (requiring label to list the calories, calories from fat, total fat,
cholesterol, sodium, carbohydrates, and sugars in a single serving of the food product).
Id. at § 343(w).
15 U.S.C. § 1261(p) (2006).
76 Fed. Reg. 36628–29 (June 22, 2011).
16 C.F.R. § 305.11 (2011).
40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (2011).
27 U.S.C. § 215 (2006).
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122

close the calories in menu items, new cars must be labeled with
123
their estimated mileage per gallon and the car’s risk-rating for roll124
ing over in a crash, children’s toys must be labeled with the toy’s
125
appropriate age-group for use, and restaurants in some cities must
126
be labeled with their health inspection grades. As perhaps the most
prominent example, our entire system of securities regulation is
127
based on disclosure laws. Are consumers confused and deceived if
they buy a car without knowing its safety ratings, or eat at a restaurant
128
without knowing how it performed in its latest health inspection?
What all of these disclosure policies have in common is that they
are all motivated by the state’s interest in a more informed public.
The state’s immediate purpose in enacting these policies is to inform
consumers, with the hopes that consumers will use the information to
make more informed decisions that will promote the state’s broader
goals. Given that the rationale for Zauderer’s reduced scrutiny is that
First Amendment values are served by increasing consumers’ access
to commercial information, disclosure policies that are motivated by
122

123
124

125
126

127

128

See Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Nutrition Labeling in Chain Restaurants: State and Local
Laws/Bills/Regulations: 2009–2010, CSPI.ORG (Feb. 16, 2010), http://cspinet.org/
new/pdf/ml_bill_summaries_09.pdf (listing state and local menu labeling laws as of
2009–2010); see also Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, State and Local Menu Labeling Policies,
CSPI.ORG (Apr. 2011), http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/ml_map.pdf (displaying map showing the implementation status of menu labeling laws across the country). As part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, menu-labeling requirements will soon be
imposed across the country. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). This Act
requires all restaurant chains with twenty or more locations doing business under the
same name to disclose the number of calories in regular menu items on the restaurant’s
menu board and written menus. The law also requires the affected restaurants to include, on their menu or menu boards, a “succinct statement concerning suggested daily
caloric intake” that is “designed to enable the public to understand, in the context of a
total daily diet, the significance of the caloric information that is provided on the menu.”
Id.
16 C.F.R. § 259.1 (2011).
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 12, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (2006)).
16 C.F.R. § 1501.2(b) (2011).
See 24 R.N.Y.C. § 23-03 (2010); see also Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 214 n.97 (2005) [hereinafter Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech] (listing a variety of consumer labeling requirements enforced by the Federal Trade Commission).
NICHOLAS WOLFSON, CORPORATE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE SEC 28–29 (1990)
(noting that Zauderer’s distinction between bans on speech and mandatory disclosures
“serves as a basis for the mandatory disclosure system of the SEC. The structure of securities regulation relies heavily on required disclosure in the sale of securities, shareholder
meetings, and takeover transactions”).
See FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12–13 (listing different disclosure laws and their purposes).
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the state’s interest in an informed public, regardless of the further
goals the disclosure policy is designed to achieve, should fall within
the doctrine.
It is worth considering the policy implications that would result if
Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scrutiny applied to these types
of compelled speech policies rather than Zauderer’s rational basis test.
There is no guarantee that these disclosure policies would meet Central Hudson’s requirement that the regulation directly advance the
state interest and be no more extensive than necessary. The Central
Hudson test has been widely criticized for being difficult to apply in a
consistent and predictable manner, with a significant divergence of
opinion as to how much protection the test affords to commercial
129
speech.
Given the widespread acceptance of compelled risk label130
ing as an appropriate regulatory strategy, there are strong policy arguments for interpreting Zauderer broadly to recognize the validity of
other state interests.
Looking, for example, to compelled speech requirements that
serve the state’s interest in informing the public in order to promote
public health and safety, it is largely assumed that the wide range of
disclosures serving this substantial state goal do not violate the First
131
Amendment.
And given the Court’s recognition that the government “has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and

129

130

131

See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 630–31 (1990) (“[J]udges and Justices have filled quite a bit of space in the case reporters trying to figure out precisely what forms of regulation the [Central Hudson] test
permits. . . . [T]he cases have been able to shed little light on Central Hudson, aside from
standing as ad hoc subject-specific examples of what is permissible and what is not.”);
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 42 (“The bland, generic quality of [the Central Hudson test elements] is unconnected to any particular First
Amendment theory, which is no doubt why they have proved susceptible to such wide
swings of application.”).
See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2006) (listing product warnings and nutritional informational labels as the “most prominent examples” of
constitutionally permissible compelled speech).
Estreicher, supra note 60, at 272 (“Even where there is no history of misleading advertisements, the state may compel advertisers to warn that their products’ intended uses
pose dangers to public health or safety. This is routine in the case of poisons and hazardous chemicals. The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that the public is aware
of the known dangers attendant to the lawful decisions the advertising seeks to promote.”
(footnote omitted)). Despite this assumption, the Court has never actually addressed this
issue. See Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: A PopulationBased Approach to the First Amendment, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 363, 423 (2006) (“Although
both the common law and state and federal regulations have long compelled warnings
and disclosures, the Supreme Court has never squarely considered whether or when such
public health mandates violate the First Amendment.”).
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132

welfare of its citizens” that may justify commercial speech regula133
tions, there seems little rationale for limiting Zauderer to disclosure
laws that cure consumer deception. If Zauderer were limited in this
way, widely accepted disclosure policies like mandated nutrition labeling of packaged foods would be subject to Central Hudson’s requirement that the speech required be no more extensive than necessary. Nutrition panel labeling, which has been mandated since
134
1990, serves the state’s important interest in informing the public in
135
order to protect health —an interest that is equally, if not more important, than the state’s interest in curing deceptive or misleading
commercial speech. Mandated nutrition labels provide just one example of the type of compelled commercial speech serving the state’s
public health goals that would be subject to searching judicial review
were Zauderer’s rational basis test inapplicable.
C. Limitations on the State’s Interest
Recognizing that rational basis scrutiny should apply to disclosure
policies that serve the state’s interest in an informed public does not
mean, however, that all informational disclosures applied to commercial speech are per se legitimate under the First Amendment.
First, Zauderer itself explicitly cautions that “unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First

132
133

134

135

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995).
See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (recognizing the state’s
substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use in applying the Central Hudson
test).
In 1990, Congress enacted the first comprehensive food labeling law, the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, which requires the labels on packaged food products to contain
detailed information about the item’s nutritional content. Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2, 104
Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). See, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006) (requiring label to list the calories, calories from fat, total fat, cholesterol, sodium, carbohydrates, and sugars in a single serving of the food product).
H.R. Rep. 101-538, at 9–10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3339 (“The Surgeon General has advised Americans that diets low in fats, low in salt and high in fiber
can reduce the risk of chronic diseases such as cancer and heart disease. . . . [S]tatements
regarding the level of these nutrients in foods will assist Americans in following the Surgeon General’s guidelines.”); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2396 (Jan. 6, 1993) (“Standardizing the nutrition information that appears in food labeling, including nutrient content
claims, will make it easier for consumers to find, understand, and compare the information they need to make healthy eating choices.”). The Act’s inclusion of a provision
permitting the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to mandate the
inclusion of additional nutritional information that is not otherwise specified in the Act if
he determines that such information will “assist consumers in maintaining healthy dietary
practices,” 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(2)(A), further illustrates the underlying public health
goals.
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Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”
Thus, if
the disclosure requirement is so extensive that it serves to restrict or
chill the speaker’s ability to engage in commercial speech, such a disclosure interferes with the speaker’s First Amendment rights. Second, in order for Zauderer to apply, the state must have an interest in
providing the public with more information germane to the particular commercial speech at issue: there must be a legitimate nexus be137
tween the information compelled and the commercial speech. The
state could not, for example, require all packaged food products to
bear the warning “smoking causes cancer,” because such a disclosure
bears no legitimate nexus to the food products being sold. And the
third limitation on Zauderer requires that the state have an actual interest in informing the public—there must be some legitimate reason
why the compelled information is of value to consumers. For instance, if the state were to compel all toys to have a label displaying
the names of the individuals who designed the toy, with absolutely no
rationale for why that information was of interest or value to consumers, such a disclosure would not serve the state’s interest in an informed public.
This third limitation is similar to the reading of Zauderer adopted
by the Second Circuit, which while applying rational basis scrutiny to
disclosures motivated by purposes beyond curing deception, does not
apply rational basis review to a commercial disclosure law whose sole
purpose is to gratify “consumer curiosity.” In International Dairy Foods
138
Ass’n v. Amestoy, the Second Circuit applied Central Hudson to Vermont’s law compelling dairy manufacturers to disclose whether their
products were derived from herds treated with recombinant Bovine
Somatotropin (“rBST”). Importantly, Vermont took no position on
whether rBST had any health effects, and justified the law solely on
the grounds that some consumers were interested in learning whether rBST had been used. The panel majority struck down the law,
concluding that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough
state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual

136
137

138

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
Although Zauderer does not make this limitation explicit, the Court’s analysis is tied to the
commercial speaker’s lack of autonomy interest in not providing accurate information
about his particular products and services. See id. at 651 n.14 (“The right of a commercial
speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding his services is not . . . a fundamental
right.” (emphasis added)). A commercial speaker does, however, have an autonomy interest in not being required to provide information, even if purely factual, about something that is irrelevant to the speaker’s commercial endeavors.
92 F.3d 67, 72–74 (2d Cir. 1996).
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statement.” While the panel majority’s analysis in International Dairy
Foods can be criticized for failing to recognize the ways in which the
disclosure at issue was relevant to both public health and ethical con140
cerns about the hormone’s effect on cows, subsequent cases have
made clear that its holding is confined to disclosure laws whose sole
purpose is to satisfy consumer curiosity. In New York State Restaurant
Ass’n, the Second Circuit reiterated that International Dairy Foods’ use
of Central Hudson is “expressly limited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no other interest other than the
141
gratification of ‘consumer curiosity.’”
Thus, the Second Circuit’s subsequent reading of Amestoy supports
the conclusion that a compelled speech law that fails to convey information of any worth does not serve the commercial speech doctrine’s goal of furthering consumers’ informational interests and
should not be subject to rational basis review. The state’s interest in
an informed public must be tied to some sort of ultimate goal that
the information will serve: to encourage healthier eating habits, to
increase consumers’ knowledge of a product’s safety risks, to protect
against deception, or another motivation for the disclosure that goes
beyond mere satisfaction of curiosity.
Moreover, as discussed throughout this section, the state must always have a substantial interest in informing the audience. Regardless
of the state’s overall motivation for compelling speech, the state must
seek to achieve this ultimate goal by providing the audience with information. The calorie disclosures, for example, are motivated by the
state’s interest in preventing and combatting obesity, but the state’s
immediate goal is to inform consumers. It is this informational goal
139

140

141

Id. at 74. One of the panel’s clear worries was the inability to place any limit on what
types of disclosures might be required, were consumer curiosity alone a sufficient state interest. See id.
See id. at 75–77 (Leval, J., dissenting). Judge Leval notes that the long-term health effects
of rBST are unknown, and that the disclosure therefore does serve the state’s interest in
public health even if short-term studies have not established deleterious health effects.
Moreover, Judge Leval notes other interests served by the disclosure, which include
health risks to cows, the economic effects of the hormone’s use on smaller dairy farmers,
and moral objections to genetically modified food. Id. See also Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118
HARV. L. REV. 525, 572–73 (2004). However, as Professor Kysar argues, Judge Leval’s
“stinging dissent” fails “to distinguish between the interests that consumers might espouse
in favor of a state disclosure law and the interests that the state actually invokes.” Id. at
572. Vermont did not advance other state interests as justification for the law, and Judge
Leval’s dissent “was an attempt to resolve a different case than the one before the court.”
Id. at 573.
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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that justifies treating compelled commercial speech differently from
outright restrictions on commercial speech. As the following section
will illustrate, when the state no longer seeks to inform consumers,
and instead compels speech that spreads a normative message, Zauderer’s rational basis scrutiny should no longer apply.
IV. THE CONTENT OF THE DISCLOSURE: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS ON
THE TYPES OF DISCLOSURE THAT CAN BE REQUIRED?
Commercial disclosures must provide “purely factual and uncon142
troversial information” to be subject to Zauderer’s rational basis test.
The purely factual nature of a disclosure law was one of the reasons
for distinguishing Zauderer from the compelled ideological speech at
143
issue in Barnette and Wooley. While a speaker may have an autonomy
interest in not being required to recite the pledge of allegiance or
display the state motto on his vehicle, a commercial speaker’s constitutionally protected autonomy interest is minimal when he refuses to
provide additional factual information about his products or services.
Some forms of compelled speech, such as the aforementioned restaurant menu disclosures, clearly qualify as mandating purely factual,
144
uncontroversial information.
However, when the government
moves beyond compelled speech that provides descriptive information about a given product or service, to compelled speech that
urges the audience to take a certain course of action, the government
no longer compels the provision of factual and uncontroversial information. Instead, the government compels “normative speech,”
and such compelled speech should not be subject to rational basis review.
The term “normative speech,” as used in this Article, describes
speech that expresses the government’s beliefs about how an individual should behave. Thus, when the government compels speech that
145
tells the audience what it “ought” to do, this speech conveys the
government’s normative message, even if this message is based on
factual information about a product or service. It is the difference
between compelling a restaurant owner to post a sign stating that a
142
143
144
145

Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
Id.
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 134 (noting that the plaintiffs do not “contend that disclosure of calorie information is not ‘factual’”).
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739) (drawing distinction between statements
that describe the world, and statements that describe what one “ought” or “ought not”
do).
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hamburger has 800 calories, and a sign stating “you should not eat
this hamburger if you are overweight.” While compelled speech raises fewer First Amendment concerns when it injects more information
into the marketplace of ideas for the benefit of consumers, this distinction disappears if the compelled speech conveys the government’s normative message. This conclusion, however, does not mean
that compelled normative speech per se violates the First Amendment. Instead, what this conclusion means is that Central Hudson, rather than Zauderer, sets forth the proper level of scrutiny for these
146
kinds of commercial speech regulations.
The line between factual and normative disclosures may seem
somewhat arbitrary: after all, factual disclosures also serve the government’s normative agenda. The government’s goal in posting a
sign stating that a hamburger has 800 calories is to discourage individuals, particularly those who are overweight, from eating the hamburger, so why should we treat a sign stating “you should not eat this
hamburger if you are overweight” differently from a sign stating the
hamburger’s caloric content? While there is assuredly a normative
component to the calorie disclosure, the actual speech being compelled does not contain the government’s normative message. In
contrast, when the speaker is being forced to repeat the government’s normative judgments, her autonomy is being compromised:
147
she is being forced to be a billboard for the government’s message.
Compelled normative speech, even if based on factual information
about a product’s risks, raises similar concerns as Wooley and Barnette
by forcing the speaker to express the government’s opinions and be148
liefs.
While a speaker’s constitutionally protected autonomy interests
are minimal when she is being required to include more information
in her commercial speech, the Court has made clear that a speaker
does have an autonomy interest in not being required to spread the
government’s normative message, even when engaging in commer149
cial speech. In United States v. United Foods, Inc., the Court evaluated
146
147

148

149

This conclusion will be discussed further, infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (“New Hampshire’s statute in effect
requires that appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s
ideological message—or suffer a penalty . . . .”).
See id. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable. . . . The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New
Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”).
533 U.S. 405 (2001).
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a First Amendment challenge to a statute requiring mushroom producers to subsidize commercial speech promoting a message with
150
The mushroom producer challenging the
which they disagreed.
law disagreed with the message that all mushrooms are worthy of
consuming, and wished to spread its own message that its brand of
mushrooms were of superior quality. Though recognizing that the
mushroom producer’s disagreement with the message at issue could
be characterized as “minor,” the Court found that “First Amendment
values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular
citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for
151
speech on the side that it favors.”
As Dean Post argues, United Foods can be read as standing for the
following proposition: while commercial speech is protected because
of the First Amendment interests of its audience, speakers engaged in
commercial speech retain independent First Amendment interests
152
that can be violated by certain forms of compelled speech. In United Foods, the Court makes clear that a speaker’s First Amendment
rights are violated by a compelled message, even if (1) the speech at
issue is commercial, and (2) the compelled message merely advocates
the use of a product, rather than compelling adherence to ideological beliefs. The message at issue did not provide purely factual information about the health benefits of eating mushrooms—it was a
153
normative and viewpoint-based message urging consumers to eat
any brand of mushrooms. The Court’s reasoning in United Foods
makes clear that the rational basis test set forth in Zauderer should not
apply if the state compels the inclusion of a normative message in
154
commercial speech.
The key question, however, is how to identify when a commercial
disclosure law no longer conveys pure facts and crosses the line into
normative speech. As discussed above, the government’s ultimate objective of changing consumer behavior does not mean that the

150
151
152

153
154

Id. at 410–11.
Id. at 411.
Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets, supra note 72, at 577 (“The holding of United Foods
can be explained only on the assumption that commercial speakers retain significant
constitutional interests that are not fully captured by the constitutional values inherent in
the circulation of information. . . . United Foods must break with the Court’s traditional
explanation of its commercial speech doctrine and move from constitutional values that
are audience-centered to those that are speaker-centered.”).
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411.
See Estreicher, supra note 60, at 272 (arguing that compelling commercial speakers to
“serve as a medium for another person’s ideological communications” violates their First
Amendment right not to speak).
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speech is normative. In fact, many commercial disclosure laws have
the express purpose of changing behavior through information. Nutritional disclosures on packaged products seek to encourage healthier food choices, warnings on alcohol packages seek to discourage
pregnant women from drinking, and written warning labels on cigarette packages seek to curb smoking rates. The fact that a given dis155
closure has a “consumer . . . modification objective” does not mean
that the disclosure requires the commercial actor to adopt the government’s normative message. After all, if the information were irrelevant to consumers’ decisions, it would be impossible to argue that
the state had an interest in mandating the provision of this information. The objective of any information disclosure policy is to “provide new information that can potentially alter individual deci156
sions.”
The distinction, however, is that the immediate purpose of these
disclosure policies is to convey uncontroversial factual information
about a given product, even if the ultimate motive is to change behav157
ior. None of these disclosures require commercial actors to express
the government’s message that a given product is good or bad. The
state seeks to persuade individuals to make certain choices by providing them with relevant factual information, which is a valid goal given
that the purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect the
158
audience’s informational interests.
As the Ninth Circuit recently
observed, albeit in a case that was reheard en banc:
[M]ost disclosure requirements, from nutritional facts on packaged
foods to the financial details of publicly traded companies, are designed
to remedy information asymmetries and potentially alter individuals’ behavior as they become more well-informed market participants. As long
as those who are compelled to disclose are not required to endorse the
possible result of a better-informed market . . . the fact that legislators
may desire the resulting behavior is irrelevant. In such cases, the disclos-

155

156
157

158

See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality of
Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 880–81 (2010)
(“Many existing labeling requirements depend upon government authority to require
disclosure of information because of the ‘reactions’ it presumes consumers will have to
un-supplemented information and for the purpose of modifying consumer behavior to
serve the government’s determination of the public interest.”).
WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 5
(1992).
See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 794 (2001) (distinguishing between the “further purpose” or “motive” behind a law, and the law’s “immediate purpose,” and concluding that courts should focus on the law’s immediate purpose).
See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note 156, at 6 (“[T]he objective of such efforts is informed
choice, not simply altered choice.”).
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ing party is required only to provide the raw facts that others may use to
159
make their own decisions.

In contrast, if the mandated disclosure expresses the government’s normative message about the product, such a law crosses the
line set by Wooley, Barnette, and United Foods. This kind of disclosure
law does not seek to change behavior through information, but rather to change behavior by spreading the government’s message that
a certain product should or should not be used.
It will often be easy to determine whether a written or oral disclosure expresses a normative message, because the normative content
will be evident based on the disclosure’s face. For example, the
aforementioned hypothetical disclosure “you should not eat this
hamburger if you are overweight” explicitly spreads a normative message. Compelled graphic or visual disclosures, however, may be more
difficult to evaluate—it is not easy to evaluate whether a visual graphic conveys factual information or instead spreads a normative message. What if the state were to require all menu items over 1000 calories to be accompanied by a picture of an obese person surrounded
by empty food containers? Does this image just convey factual information, or does it disgust viewers and spread the government’s message that you should not order that particular item? As Professor Rebecca Tushnet has persuasively argued, “[t]he power of images comes
not just from the emotions they evoke but also from the linked feature that they are hard to see as arguments: they persuade without
160
overt appeals to rhetoric.”
An image may contain factual infor161
mation, but it may also appeal to the audience’s emotions: images
162
can “persuade without seeming to persuade.” One needs only con159

160
161

162

!

Jerry Beeman & Pharm. Servs. Inc. v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 652 F.3d 1085,
1101 n.16 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original), reh’g en banc granted, 661 F.3d 1199 (9th
Cir. 2011), question certified by 682 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2012).
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683,
692 (2012).
Id. at 696 (“Images, by not making their appeal to emotion explicit, provide a way to
bring emotion to law despite law’s expressed discomfort with emotions.”); see also Christina O. Spiesel et al., Law in the Age of Images: The Challenge of Visual Literacy, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 231, 237 (Anne Wagner et al. eds.,
2005) (arguing that visual stories are “rich in emotional appeal, which is deeply tied to
the communicative power of imagery. This power stems in part from the impression that
visual images are unmediated. They seem to be caused by the reality they depict”); Amy
Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures: The Art of Censorship,
103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 213 (2000) (“[B]y bypassing reason and appealing directly to the
senses, images fail to participate in the marketplace of ideas.”).
Tushnet, supra note 160, at 696. See also Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, Introduction to
LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 7 (Costas
Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999) (“Images are sensual and fleshy; they address the la-
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sider the government’s recent refusal to release photos of Osama Bin
Laden’s dead body to illustrate the point that images convey more
than just factual information, and can elicit strong emotional reac163
tions from viewers. It can be very difficult to conclude based on the
face of an image whether the image just conveys factual information.
Because of the difficulty in evaluating whether visual disclosures
mandate normative speech, courts should look to the government’s
actual purpose in mandating the visual disclosure when determining
whether rational basis scrutiny is warranted. Courts have ample experience smoking out illegitimate government purposes, particularly
164
within the First Amendment doctrine, and a purpose inquiry is the
most reliable way of ensuring that the state does not use visual commercial disclosure laws to spread normative messages that are disguised as factual speech. In order to determine whether rational basis scrutiny applies to a visual disclosure law, courts should evaluate
the government’s purpose in mandating the disclosure: if the government’s actual purpose is not to inform consumers, but rather to
spread the government’s normative message, then the disclosure falls
outside of Zauderer.
This section will look to laws requiring compelled speech in the
sale of tobacco in an effort to identify the line separating disclosures
designed to inform consumers from disclosures designed to spread a
normative message. I will consider new species of tobacco warning
laws that do not just provide written warnings about the product’s
health consequences, and instead accompany these written warnings
with visual depictions of the consequences of tobacco use. I conclude
that the state intends for these disclosures to spread a normative message that individuals should not smoke, and that the disclosures

163

164

bile elements of the self, they speak to the emotions . . . . They have the power to shortcircuit reason and enter the soul . . . .”); David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty,
Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 183 (2006) (showing that jurors often have an emotional response to gruesome
photographs).
Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Judicial Watch,
Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Def., 2012 WL 1438688 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2012) (No. 11-890) (“The
release of images showing the bullet wound to bin Laden’s head plausibly and logically
pose a particularly grave threat of inflaming anti-American sentiment and resulting in retaliatory harm.”). The district court accepted the government’s argument, concluding
that the government’s testimony “that the release of images of his body could reasonably
be expected to pose a risk of grave harm to our future national security is more than
mere speculation.” Judicial Watch, 2012 WL 1438688, at *15.
For a discussion of the role of legislative purpose in the First Amendment doctrine, see
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996). See also Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 794.
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should be subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson rather than Zauderer’s rational basis test.
A. Overview of Tobacco Warning Laws
The federal government has mandated warning labels on cigarette packages since 1965. The labels carried on cigarette packages,
which have been modified over the years, are “the most familiar ex165
ample” of mandatory informational disclosures, and provide yet
another example of a disclosure policy that serves interests beyond
curing consumer deception and confusion.
The first iteration of tobacco labeling, the Federal Cigarette La166
beling and Advertising Act of 1965, required cigarette packages to
carry the following warning: “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
167
Hazardous to Your Health.” In 1984, the text of the warning label
was modified, and cigarette advertisements were also required to car168
ry health warnings. The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act
amended the 1965 act to require the rotation of four different warning labels on packaging and advertising. Congress’s stated purpose in
adopting the new labeling requirements was to make “Americans
more aware of any adverse health effects of smoking . . . and to ena169
ble individuals to make informed decisions about smoking.” These
warning labels have never been challenged by the tobacco industry as
170
unconstitutionally compelling speech.
While cigar companies did
challenge similar warning requirements imposed on cigar packaging
and advertising by the state of Massachusetts, the First Circuit reject171
ed their challenge, relying on Zauderer.

165
166

167
168
169
170
171

Sunstein, supra note 54, at 661.
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
The stated purpose of the 1965 Act was to enact a uniform cigarette labeling requirement
that would ensure that the public was “adequately informed that cigarette smoking may
be hazardous to health . . . .” Id.
Id.
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2201 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2006)).
Id.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011).
Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds
by Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). More specifically, the cigar companies argued that the requirement that the warnings cover 25% of the main panel of the
packaging and 20% of the advertisements unduly burdened their commercial speech.
The First Circuit rejected this argument, given that Zauderer does not require a least restrictive means analysis, and the compelled warnings were “reasonably related to a substantial state interest.” Id. at 55.
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The most recent federal legislation, the Family Smoking Preven172
tion and Tobacco Control Act, adopts nine different warning labels
to be rotated on cigarette packages:
WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive. WARNING: Tobacco smoke can
harm your children. WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease.
WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer. WARNING: Cigarettes cause
strokes and heart disease. WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can
harm your baby. WARNING: Smoking can kill you. WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers. WARNING: Quitting
173
smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health.

The warning label must take up 50% of the front and rear of the cig174
arette package, and 20% of any print advertisement. The Act also
requires the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
to “issue regulations that require color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking to accompany the label state175
ments . . . .”
In accordance with the Act, the FDA issued a Proposed Rule setting forth thirty-six potential graphic images to be displayed on to176
bacco packaging and advertisements.
The Proposed Rule also required the warning labels to include “a reference to a smoking
177
cessation assistance resource.”
After a period of notice and comment, the FDA published a Final Rule (“the Rule”) on June 22,
178
2011. The Rule selected nine graphic warning labels. The selected
images have been described as follows:
[A] man exhaling cigarette smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his
throat; a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant receiving a kiss
from his or her mother; a pair of diseased lungs next to a pair of healthy
lungs; a diseased mouth afflicted with what appears to be cancerous lesions; a man breathing into an oxygen mask; a bare-chested male cadaver
lying on a table, and featuring what appears to be post-autopsy chest staples down the middle of his torso; a woman weeping uncontrollably; and
a man wearing a t-shirt that features a “no smoking” symbol and the
words “I Quit.” An additional graphic image appears to be a stylized car-

172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id. The Act permits the Secretary to modify the precise formatting stipulations mandated
by the Act to permit for the graphic labeling.
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524,
69,534–35 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
Id. at 69,564.
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June
22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
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toon (as opposed to a staged photograph) of a premature baby in an in179
cubator.

Each of the graphic images matches with one of the written warn180
ings. In addition, all of the labels must include the phone number
181
“1-800-QUIT-NOW,” which will connect smokers with smoking ces182
sation resources.
The tobacco industry has successfully challenged the FDA’s Rule
on First Amendment grounds: the D.C. Circuit recently affirmed the
United States District Court of the District of Columbia’s permanent
injunction of the FDA’s Final Rule as unconstitutional compelled
183
speech. The district court concluded that the Rule did not fit with184
in “the Zauderer paradigm” because “the graphic images here were
neither designed to protect the consumer from confusion or deception, nor to increase consumer awareness of smoking risks; rather,
they were crafted to evoke a strong emotional response calculated to
185
provoke the viewer to quit or never start smoking.”
The district
court conceded that “the line between the constitutionally permissi179

180

181
182

183
184
185

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation
omitted). The images can be accessed online. See Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings,
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/uc
m259214.htm (follow link under “High Resolution Image Formats”) (last visited Oct. 4,
2012) [hereinafter “Final Images”].
For example, the written warning “WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive” pairs with the
image of a hole in a man’s throat. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,649 (June 22, 2011).
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,686–87,
36,754–55 (June 22, 2011).
New York City has also adopted graphic labeling requirements. In the fall of 2009, New
York City’s Board of Health adopted Article 181.19, which required all of the city’s tobacco retailers to “prominently display” a sign with written information about tobacco’s adverse health effects and how to get help quitting the use of tobacco, as well as “a pictorial
image illustrating the effects of tobacco use.” N.Y., N.Y.C., BD. OF HEALTH art.
181.19(a)(b) (2009). Tobacco retailers challenged New York’s signage regime as both
being preempted by federal law, as well as violating the retailers’ First Amendment rights
by unconstitutionally compelling speech. The Southern District of New York granted
summary judgment to the retailers on their preemption claim, without addressing the
First Amendment implications of the compelled imagery. 23-34 94th Street Grocery
Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 757 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Second Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s ruling. 23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd.
of Health, No. 11-91-cv, 2012 WL 2819423 (2d Cir. July 10, 2012). Thus while the courts
have not addressed the First Amendment issues raised by New York City’s signage, the
signs raise much of the same issues as the federal graphic labels. This Article, however,
will focus on the federal labels.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 24, 2012), affirming 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012).
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
Id. at 272.
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ble dissemination of factual information and the impermissible expropriation of a company’s advertising space for Government advo186
cacy can be frustratingly blurry,” but concluded that “here the line
187
seems quite clear.”
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court,
concluding that Zauderer was inapplicable both because the graphic
188
labels did not cure consumer deception, and because the graphic
images were “not ‘purely’ factual because—as FDA tacitly admits—
they are primarily intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at
most, shock the viewer into retaining the information in the text
189
warning.”
According to the D.C. Circuit majority, the Final Rule’s
“inflammatory images and the provocatively-named hotline cannot
rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to con190
sumers,” and thus fell outside of the ambit of Zauderer.
B. Drawing the Line Between Factual Disclosures and Normative Messages
As discussed earlier in this section, the mere fact that the government’s ultimate goal is to change behavior by reducing smoking rates
does little to distinguish the graphic labeling requirements from written tobacco warnings. And while a technologically manipulated
graphic that did not accurately depict the health consequences of
smoking would assuredly raise different concerns, there is no evi191
dence that the graphics are enhanced in an unrealistic manner.
However, as the district court and the D.C. Circuit concluded, the evidence of the state’s purpose in mandating the graphic labels suggests
that these images are designed to shock and disgust viewers, not just
to inform them about the dangers of tobacco use.
When the state’s purpose in mandating a given disclosure is to
shock and disgust the audience, the disclosure forces the speaker to
spread the state’s normative message that a given product should not
be used. By intentionally appealing to the audience’s emotions rather than their reasoned judgment, this type of compelled speech
can no longer be justified based on the audience’s informational in-

186
187
188
189
190
191

Id. at 274.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 206–14.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *7 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).
Id. at *8.
The FDA conceded to the district court that some of the images had been technologically
modified, but maintained that “the effects shown in the photographs are, in fact, accurate
depictions of the effects of sickness and disease caused by smoking.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d at 270 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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terests. While so-called “fear appeals,” a term that psychologists have
used to describe “fear-arousing persuasive message[s]” that are “designed to scare people by describing the terrible things that will hap192
pen to them if they do not do what the message recommends,” have
become a regular feature of public-health campaigns for the past fifty
193
years, this type of speech admittedly does not just convey pure factual information. The psychological literature evaluating the persuasiveness of different types of fear appeals demonstrates the complexity of the emotional and cognitive processing of these types of
messages, and illustrates that the key goal in implementing fear appeals is not to inform the audience, but to appeal to the audience’s
194
emotions.
When the state intentionally compels shocking and disgusting images that capitalize on the audience’s emotional reactions, the state’s
goal is altered choice, instead of informed choice. Mandating speech
that appeals to emotion “does not improve rational decision-making
195
or encourage autonomy-affirming choices . . . .”
Instead, “[t]he
substantial literature on fear appeals and the influence of negative
emotions such as fear and anxiety induced by a particular communication shows the potential for a change in an individual’s decision
196
away from what it might have been in a non-emotional state.”
When the government designs a disclosure law that makes use of a
fear appeal, the government’s goal is not to provide consumers with
information, but rather to spread the government’s normative mes192

193
194

195
196

Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2008). See, e.g., Natascha de
Hoog, Wolfgang Stroebe, & John B. F. de Wit, The Impact of Vulnerability to and Severity of a
Health Risk on Processing and Acceptance of Fear-Arousing Communications: A Meta-Analysis, 11
REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 258, 258 (2007) (“Fear-arousing communications emphasize the
negative consequences of health-impairing behaviors to motivate individuals to change
these behaviors.”).
de Hoog et al., supra note 192, at 258.
See, e.g., id.; Glenn Leshner, Paul Bolls & Kevin Wise, Motivated Processing of Fear Appeal and
Disgust Images in Televised Anti-Tobacco Ads, 23 J. MEDIA PSYCHOL. 77 (2011); Kim Witte &
Mike Allen, A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns,
27 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 591 (2000). Under the “drive-reduction model” of fear appeals, the communication creates emotional tension that motivates or “drives” individuals
to change their behavior in order to reduce the salience of the perceived threat. de
Hoog et al., supra note 192, at 259. The “drive reduction” theory of fear appeals was first
articulated in 1953. See CARL I. HOVLAND, IRVING L. JANIS, & HAROLD H. KELLEY,
COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE (1953);
Irving L. Janis & Seymour Feshbach, Effects of Fear-Arousing Communication, 48 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 78 (1953).
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 939, 989 (2009).
Blumenthal, supra note 192, at 32.
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sage that a given product should not be used. While speakers have
minimal autonomy interests in not disclosing factual information
about their products, speakers do have a constitutionally protected
interest in not being forced to shock and disgust consumers about
the dangers of a particular product.
The FDA’s selection criterion for choosing which tobacco
graphics to impose suggests that the government’s purpose in requiring the graphic labels was not to provide tobacco users with information about health risks, but rather to shock and disgust them into
not using tobacco. A 2007 Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) Report that
is cited throughout the FDA’s regulations in support of the new
197
graphic labels makes clear that, going forward, the “primary objective of tobacco regulation is not to promote informed choice, but rather to discourage consumption of tobacco products, especially by
198
children and youths.”
In designing the graphic images, the FDA
was very clear that it sought to reduce smoking rates by using graphic
199
images that were “frightening or visually disturbing.” When deciding which graphic warnings to adopt in the Final Rule, the FDA
measured several effects of the visual warnings as compared to textonly warnings. One of the most important measures relied upon during the selection process was the “salience” of the graphic image,
which included an “emotional reaction scale” that measured “how
the warning made the respondent feel, such as ‘depressed,’ ‘discour200
aged,’ and ‘afraid.’” The FDA cited to research literature that “suggests that warnings that generate an immediate emotional response
from viewers can result in viewers attaching a negative affect to smoking (i.e., feel bad about smoking), thus undermining the appeal and
201
attractiveness of smoking.”
The graphic images were designed to evoke an emotional reaction
that would convince tobacco users to stop using the product. The
197

198

199

200
201

See, e.g., Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg.
69,524, 69,529–33 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141); Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,632–40 (Jun. 22,
2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
INST. OF MED., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291
(2007) (quoting INST. OF MED., GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE
ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 236–37 (1994)). The IOM report then advocates
graphic tobacco labels as a means of discouraging tobacco consumption. Id. at 296.
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524,
69,534 (Nov. 12, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
1141).
Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,638 (Jun. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
Id. at 36,639.
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message the government sought to convey was not just that tobacco
has specific health risks, but that individuals should also not use tobacco because tobacco is dangerous, unappealing, and depressing.
Although the FDA also cited to literature demonstrating that the images were also designed to serve informational goals by increasing the
likelihood that smokers would read and think about the warning la202
bels, the government also had a completely non-informational goal:
to spread the government’s normative message that individuals
203
should not smoke.
Moreover, even if such explicit evidence of the government’s purpose were not available, such a legislative purpose can be inferred.
Courts have ample experience with the task of inferring legislative
purpose by looking to evidence such as the actual content of the law,
the law’s effects, its social context, and the common understanding of
204
the law’s purpose.
When evaluating the actual purposes behind a
disclosure law that compels imagery, the images themselves can be
useful in this process. While attempting to infer legislative purpose
based on the face of the images raises the same concerns discussed
above about the difficulty of analyzing the persuasive effects of imag205
es, sometimes courts may need to consider the images themselves in
order to get at the government’s real purpose. However, by using the
actual content of the images as just one piece of evidence in the
court’s broader task of isolating the government’s purpose, the concerns about how to analyze the true effects of visual imagery are
somewhat reduced. Moreover, when the compelled images are accompanied by text, as they are in the case of the graphic tobacco la202

203

204

205

Id. The FDA argues that “health warnings that evoke strong emotional responses enhance an individual’s ability to process the warning information, leading to increased
knowledge and thoughts about the harms of cigarettes and the extent to which the individual could personally experience a smoking-related disease.” Id. at 36,641. By increasing the likelihood that an individual will read a written warning and will contemplate the
negative health effects of smoking, the graphic images do serve informational interests.
But they do so by using the audience’s emotions, arguably in a manipulative manner.
Another informational goal served by the visual disclosures might be to convey risk information to individuals with low literacy rates. In the proposed rule, the FDA cited to
literature demonstrating that individuals with low literacy rates have difficulty recalling
text-only warnings in order to justify the need for the visual warnings. Required Warnings
for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,531 (Nov. 12, 2010)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). However, as discussed above, the FDA’s focus in selecting which graphic images to adopt was on the emotional salience of the images, not
on whether the images better conveyed health risks to consumers with low literacy rates.
Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 794–95 (indicating that the judiciary has a familiar set of
tools to interpret legislative purpose by looking to the law’s language, its effect, its legislative history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, and common knowledge).
See supra text accompanying notes 234–49.
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bels, the accompanying text can also inform the court’s analysis of
the government’s purpose.
Here, the graphic warnings themselves, displaying images such as
a dead body on an autopsy table and a plume of smoke next to a
206
newborn baby, strongly suggest that the government’s purpose was
not to inform tobacco users about smoking’s health risks, but rather
to discourage individuals from smoking by displaying shocking and
disgusting images. First, the informational content of many of the
graphic images is incredibly low: the body on the autopsy table, for
example, conveys little information beyond the accompanying textual
207
warning that “smoking can kill you.” The picture of the dead body
does not add any informational content to the warning label. Second, all of the graphic warnings include the phone number “1-800208
QUIT-NOW.”
This number explicitly conveys the government’s
normative message that individuals should quit smoking, which gives
a strong indication of the government’s purpose in compelling the
graphic images. Third, the common reaction to these images is disgust and shock—while it may be difficult, on the margins, to evaluate
whether an image is factual or normative, courts can look to the
common understanding of these images as one piece of evidence that
sheds light on the government’s purpose. Thus, even though it may
be difficult to infer legislative purpose based on the face of these images, courts have ample experience with this task, and applying these
tools to the tobacco images suggests that the government sought to
compel normative speech.
Although some of us may have fewer objections to the government’s attempt to use tobacco producers to spread a normative mes209
sage that discourages an “inherently dangerous activity” with serious
206
207

208
209

See Final Images, supra note 179, at 2, 7.
Id. at 7. As another example, one of the graphics in the final rule shows a man exhaling
smoke through what appears to be a hole in his throat, with the text “Warning: Cigarettes are addictive.” Id. at 1. While the graphic likely depicts a tracheotomy hole, the
warning label does not convey any information about what a tracheotomy is or when the
procedure is necessary. Instead, the label just shows a man holding a cigarette, and
smoke expelling through a hole in his throat. Another graphic conveys even less information about smoking’s health effects, showing a woman crying and the caption: “Warning: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers.” Id. at 8. While the FDA
claims that this image portrays “the emotional suffering experienced as a result of disease
caused by secondhand smoke exposure,” Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,696 (Jun. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 1141), this graphic provides little information about the specific health consequences
of smoking.
Final Images, supra note 179.
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2, 123 Stat.
1776, 1777 (2009).
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health consequences, this is merely because we agree with the government’s objective of reducing rates of tobacco usage. Agreeing
with the government’s overall objective, however, is not a reason for
210
ignoring the First Amendment rights of tobacco manufacturers.
While the negative health consequences of smoking are undisputed
facts, the method of presenting these facts matters. The Court has
made clear that “the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information pre211
sented” in the commercial marketplace. With the visual tobacco
images, however, the government has decided the value of the information. The government has decided that information about the
health risks of tobacco is incredibly valuable, and that tobacco manufacturers must present this information in a shocking manner that
will force the audience to react to it.
Returning to a hypothetical proposed earlier, consider if a state
decided that calorie information was not sufficiently deterring overweight consumers from ordering high-calorie items from restaurants.
As a consequence, the state decides that menus and menu boards
must include, alongside any food item containing more than 1000
calories, a picture of an obese person next to multiple empty food
containers and wrappers, along with the phone number 1-800-LOSE212
W8T. This type of visual display requirement arguably provides additional factual information about the consequences of eating highcalorie foods in service of the state’s public health goals. But the
state’s purpose would clearly not be to inform consumers—the calorie disclosure already informs individuals about the high number of
calories in those menu items. Instead, the state’s likely goal in this
hypothetical scenario would be to shock or disgust viewers and thereby persuade them to order something with fewer calories. While the
picture may also serve to highlight the calorie information for those
210

211
212

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (“[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”).
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (discussing the value of unrestricted speech
in the commercial marketplace).
This hypothetical is not that far from reality: New York City has recently promulgated a
public health advertisement that features a picture of an overweight amputee, along with
the caption: “Portions have grown. So has Type 2 diabetes, which can lead to amputations.” Patrick McGeehan, Blame Photoshop, Not Diabetes, for This Amputation, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2012, at A22. The city was criticized for using a photo of an actor with fully intact
legs, and digitally removing one of his legs to make its point. Id. While the city’s use of
fear appeals in its own advertising does not raise any First Amendment issues, requiring
restaurants or food producers to display such an image would be analogous to the visual
tobacco warnings.
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who would otherwise ignore it, the state cannot force restaurant owners to convey shocking, value-laden images to their customers in or213
Consider, as an alder to achieve the state’s informational goals.
ternative example, if a state required all abortion clinics to place a
picture of a dead fetus on their signage and advertisements, along
214
with the phone number 1-800-LUV-LIFE.
Again, the state’s real
purpose would be to shock women visiting the clinics, presumably in
the service of the state’s interest in protecting prenatal life, and to
spread the state’s normative message that women should carry their
215
pregnancies to term.
While the visual information displayed may
be based on facts, its method of presentation cannot be ignored.
Such an attempt to spread a normative message by shocking the audience does not qualify for Zauderer’s rational basis review.
This is not to say that the state can never use emotion-based fear
appeals: as mentioned above, fear appeals have a long history in public health campaigns and the state’s use of shocking imagery in its
own public health advertisements does not raise any First Amendment concerns. Nor is the state prohibited from compelling imagery—not all visual graphics are designed to spread a normative message, and the state’s attempts to use imagery that is designed to
216
inform consumers should still be subject to rational basis review.
213

214

215

216

!

See John P. Strouss III, Medical Pornography or Fair Warning: Should the United States Adopt
Canada’s Gruesome New Tobacco Labels?, 27 J. CORP. L. 315, 331 (2002) (“The government
could cover fast food packages with pictures of clogged arteries and obese people. It
could cover alcoholic beverage containers with pictures of cirrhotic livers and mangled
drunk driving victims. In a paternalistic attempt to protect us from our own decisions by
putting disgusting images on products, the government could make the world a nauseating place.”).
While the speech of an abortion clinic’s staff members to its individual patients during
the course of the patient’s care would not qualify as commercial speech, the clinic’s signage and advertisements are forms of commercial speech because they concern the offer
of services.
In the Second Circuit appeal of New York City’s signage law, the plaintiffs analogize to
the “factual” imagery used by anti-abortion groups to demonstrate how factual images can
be used to play on the audience’s emotions in the service of an ideological position. See
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 45, 23-34 94th St. Grocery, Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health,
685 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-0091) (“[T]he City’s position ignores the numerous
examples of images that, though ‘factual’ renditions of events in one sense, seek to play
on emotions or fears to convey a highly subjective message. One need only consider the
‘factual’ pictures of aborted fetuses utilized by anti-abortion groups or the controversy
over whether to release the graphic death photographs of Osama bin Laden to understand this point.”).
A majority of the Sixth Circuit recently came to this conclusion in reviewing a facial challenge to the graphic tobacco labeling requirements. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559–60 (6th Cir. 2012). Importantly, the panel was
not reviewing the actual images promulgated by the FDA. Instead, the panel reviewed
the statute’s requirement that the FDA set forth color graphics, and the panel concluded
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Zauderer itself recognizes that images in commercial advertisements
can “attract[] the attention of the audience to the advertiser’s mes217
For example,
sage” as well as “impart[ing] information directly.”
the nutritional labeling laws that apply to packaged products have
been criticized for not providing information in a clear and easily
218
understandable form. As a consequence, the FDA is currently considering adopting a front of package labeling scheme that will convey
nutritional information in a more user-friendly format. The front of
package labeling scheme will likely employ graphics like checkmarks
or stars that will highlight a food product’s negative or positive at219
tributes.
Importantly, however, the goal behind the use of these
symbols is simply to make information more easily understandable
and accessible, especially given the evidence that busy consumers
cannot always take the time to read the full nutritional label, and that
low literacy consumers do not always understand the significance of
220
the information provided on it. These symbols are not designed to
evoke emotional reactions: a “healthy choice checkmark” on a box of
cereal is a far cry from a picture of a diseased lung on a cigarette
package. Thus, if the government compels the use of a picture or
graphic whose sole purpose is to convey information, this type of
221
commercial disclosure law falls within the Zauderer paradigm. But if
the state seeks to compel speakers to act as a billboard for the state’s
normative message, rational basis review should not apply.

217
218
219

220
221

that the plaintiffs had failed to show that color graphics were per se unable to convey factual information about smoking’s health consequences. Id. at 524, 531.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 84–85.
See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Front-of-Package Food and Beverage Labeling: New Directions for Research and Regulation, 40 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 382, 383 (2011). Some food companies have voluntarily adopted front of package nutritional labeling using graphics, but the
FDA has expressed concern that these voluntary labels may represent certain food products as being healthier than warranted. Id. The FDA hopes that a uniform graphic labeling scheme with set criterion will ensure that the labels accurately convey a product’s nutritional benefits, or lack thereof. Id.
Background Information on Point of Purchase Labeling, FDA (Oct. 2009), www.fda.gov/Food/
LabelingNutrition/LabelClaims/ucm187320.htm.
In some instances pictures or graphics may be the best way to convey a certain fact given
our understanding of how individuals actually process information. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 195 (2005) (“[I]t is hopelessly inadequate to say that when people lack relevant information the best response is to provide it. . . . [I]f people lack information, a great deal of attention needs to be paid to information processing . . . .”). Thus, refusing to extend Zauderer to situations where the
government plays on the audience’s emotions does not restrict the government from
conveying information in an easily understandable format: it simply prohibits the government from using emotional appeals that do not promote autonomy and freedom of
choice.
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C. Applying Central Hudson to the Visual Tobacco Laws
Nor does my conclusion mean that all compelled normative
speech is per se unconstitutional. It simply means that this type of
compelled speech should not be subject to rational basis review. It
remains possible that the graphic tobacco warnings would be able to
meet a higher level of scrutiny.
Since the visual tobacco warnings apply to commercial speech, the
government must meet Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scrutiny. The D.C. Circuit recently reached this same conclusion in evaluating the graphic tobacco labels, disagreeing with the district court’s
holding that strict scrutiny should apply, and instead applying Central
222
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny. Given that there is no question that
the warnings on tobacco packages affect tobacco manufacturers’
commercial speech, the government must satisfy Central Hudson: the
regulation must be in the service of a substantial state interest, the

222

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003, at *8 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 24, 2012). The district court did not provide any explanation for why Central
Hudson, which sets forth the general test for commercial speech regulations, would not
apply to the graphic tobacco labels. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp.
2d 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2012). The district court also failed to provide any Supreme Court
precedent to support its conclusion that strict scrutiny should apply. Id. at 274. Although
the district court cited to the Seventh Circuit’s recent application of strict scrutiny to a
state law that required games deemed “sexually explicit” to be labeled with a sticker indicating that the games were for those over age eighteen, id. (citing Entm’t Software Ass’n
v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)), the Seventh Circuit also did not provide any rationale for why strict scrutiny, rather than Central Hudson, was the proper test.
Entm’t Software Ass’n, 469 F.3d at 652. Looking to Supreme Court precedent on point,
while the Court applied strict scrutiny to the compelled speech at issue in Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), the Court was explicit that the law under review affected the electric company’s fully-protected, noncommercial speech. See id. at 8 (holding that the company’s newsletter received full First
Amendment protection because its contents are “no different from a small newspaper . . . [ranging] from energy-saving tips to stories about wildlife conservation”). Similarly, while the Court applied strict scrutiny to the compelled speech requirement at issue in
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), the Court did so after concluding that the disclosure affected fully-protected, non-commercial speech. Id. at 795–96.
Looking to the Court’s application of strict scrutiny when evaluating a regulation affecting commercial speech, while the Court applied strict scrutiny to the compelled subsidy
at issue in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) this was because the government had not argued that Central Hudson should apply. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at
410 (“[T]he Government itself does not rely upon Central Hudson to challenge the Court
of Appeals’ decision, and we therefore do not consider whether the Government’s interest could be considered substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson test.” (citation
omitted)). In sum, there is no Supreme Court precedent that supports the D.C. District
Court’s statement that the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to regulations that compel commercial speech. The D.C. Circuit correctly held that Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scrutiny sets forth the proper test.
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regulation must directly serve that state interest, and it must be no
223
more extensive than necessary.
While a thorough analysis of the Central Hudson test is beyond the
224
scope of this article, the state may well be able to show that the visual tobacco warnings meet Central Hudson’s test given the serious
health risks of tobacco usage and the inability of current textual
warnings to convey these health risks to consumers. First, given the
public health consequences of smoking, the graphic warnings clearly
serve a substantial state interest in reducing smoking rates and effec225
tively communicating the health risks of smoking to consumers.
Second, the visual tobacco warnings directly serve this interest by
conveying shocking and disgusting images that convey this risk information and discourage individuals from starting or continuing to
226
smoke.
The dispositive question is whether the government would be able
to meet Central Hudson’s final requirement that the regulation is no
more extensive than necessary in order for the government to
achieve its goal. Given the evidence that text-only tobacco warnings
227
are often ignored or quickly forgotten, the fact that shocking
graphic warnings may lead to greater recall of the warning and to a
228
higher likelihood of cessation behavior helps to demonstrate that
the graphic warnings are no more extensive than necessary. Here,
the strong emotional reactions caused by the graphic images actually
223
224

225
226
227

228

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion provides further analysis of this point, with the majority concluding that the labels do not meet the Central Hudson test. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
2012 WL 3632003, at *9–12. The dissent comes to the opposite conclusion. See id. at
*23–26 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
See id. at *23–24 (Rogers, J. dissenting) (discussing the substantial government interests at
stake).
See id. at *24.
Paul M. Fischer et al., Recall and Eye Tracking Study of Adolescents Viewing Tobacco Advertisements, 261 JAMA 84, 88 (1989) (finding that almost two-thirds of adolescents surveyed ignored the textual warnings or did not look at the warning for long enough to recall any
words); Thomas N. Robinson & Joel D. Killen, Do Cigarette Warning Labels Reduce Smoking?
Paradoxical Effects Among Adolescents, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 267,
270 (1997) (finding that as little as one third of surveyed regular teenage smokers recalled seeing a textual warning).
Geoffrey T. Fong et al., The impact of pictures on the effectiveness of tobacco warnings, 87 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 640, 640–42 (2009); David Hammond et al., Showing leads to doing:
graphic cigarette warning labels are an effective public health policy, 16 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 223,
223–24 (2006); David Hammond et al., Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Packages:
Findings from the International Tobacco Control Four Country Study, 32 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE
MED. 202, 207 (2007); Michelle O’Hegarty et al., Reactions of Young Smokers to Warning Labels on Cigarette Packages, 30 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 467, 467 (2006).
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support their constitutionality by strengthening the government’s
case for the need to go beyond text-only warnings in order to achieve
its goal of reducing smoking rates. The application of Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scrutiny, however, will ensure that the government can only seek to compel normative speech that shocks and
disgusts in narrow circumstances where bare factual information fails
229
to adequately serve the substantial state interests at stake.
D. Implications for Other Commercial Disclosure Policies
The new tobacco warning laws are not the only circumstance in
which the government compels normative disclosures. Thus, it is
worth noting the implications of applying Central Hudson to normative disclosure policies outside of the tobacco context. Consider, for
example, the federal requirements that hazardous pesticides be labeled with precautionary statements such as “wear goggles or face
230
shield and rubber gloves when handling,” or “do not breathe va231
pors.”
These are normative statements that explicitly direct individuals how to behave, instead of simply providing information about
the hazards associated with these products. As a consequence, were
such labeling requirements to be challenged on First Amendment
grounds, the distinction between normative and factual speech would
mean that these labels would have to meet Central Hudson’s test. Given that these pesticides pose serious and immediate health consequences, however, the government would very likely be able to show
that these types of labeling requirements directly advance the state’s
interest and are no more extensive than necessary. Poisonous chemicals that pose immediate risks to life are precisely the type of situation
where a normative government message can be justified on First
Amendment grounds. Thus, while the distinction between normative

229

230
231

Though Central Hudson sets forth the general test for compelled commercial speech that
spreads a normative message, it is important to caution that Central Hudson’s intermediate
scrutiny would not apply if the state were to compel commercial speakers to include political or ideological messages in their commercial speech. For example, if the state were to
require tobacco packages and advertisements to include a message supporting health
care reform, strict scrutiny should apply. The state cannot use commercial speech as a
vehicle for spreading its own political and ideological messages, even if these messages
have some marginal relationship to the particular product being sold. For a discussion of
the First Amendment issues raised by compelled ideological speech, albeit in a noncommercial context, see Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound
Laws: The First Amendment’s Limits on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
40 C.F.R. § 156.70.
Id.
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and factual disclosures may make it more difficult to establish the
constitutionality of certain disclosure policies, it is very likely that
such disclosure policies would withstand any First Amendment chal232
lenges.
V. ZAUDERER’S SCOPE: WHAT TYPE OF SPEECH CAN BE REQUIRED TO
INCLUDE A FACTUAL DISCLOSURE?
Perhaps the most fundamental limit on Zauderer’s scope is the type
of speech at issue: Zauderer’s rational basis test only applies if the
compelled disclosure is attached to commercial speech. What Zauderer fails to articulate, and indeed what the Court has yet to articulate, is a coherent definition of what qualifies as commercial
233
speech. The increasing use of disclosure laws as a regulatory strategy in realms outside the classic definition of commercial speech will
challenge the courts to develop a more workable definition of commercial speech. This section will look to a new species of disclosure
laws, those targeting pregnancy service centers, in an effort to develop a flexible test for identifying commercial speech that takes into
account the purposes of the commercial speech doctrine and the
consumer’s informational interests.
A. The Current Doctrine’s Confused Definition of Commercial Speech
In the Supreme Court’s first extension of First Amendment protections to commercial speech, Virginia Pharmacy, the Court characterized commercial speech as “speech which does no more than pro234
pose a commercial transaction.”
For the statute at issue in that
case, which restricted pharmacists from advertising the price of pre232

233

234

Moreover, were producers of hazardous chemicals to challenge these types of labeling
requirements on First Amendment grounds, their argument that these disclosures violate
their autonomy seems shaky at best. The government’s normative message merely informs the audience how to use the product properly in order to minimize risks to health.
While tobacco manufacturers assuredly disagree with the government’s message “do not
smoke,” pesticide producers likely do not disagree with the government’s message that
individuals should wear goggles when using their product.
See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 129, at 638–39 (arguing that the Court’s definition
of commercial speech “starts breaking down” when the commercial nature of more complicated speech acts are analyzed); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1184–85 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme
Court, for all it has said about commercial speech, has conspicuously avoided saying just
what it is.”).
Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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scription drugs, such a narrow definition sufficed. The Court later
described speech proposing a commercial transaction as “the core
235
notion of commercial speech.” Central Hudson provides little elaboration on the definition of commercial speech that falls outside of
this core, describing commercial speech as speech “related solely to
236
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” While the
Court has characterized the Central Hudson definition as encompass237
ing a “somewhat larger category” of speech than that articulated in
Virginia Pharmacy, this definition has been criticized for failing to set
238
forth a workable test for identifying commercial speech.
The
Court, however, does not pretend that there is a clear-cut definition
of commercial speech: the Court has recognized the “difficulty of
drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a
239
distinct category.”
The Court’s most extensive discussion of the boundaries of commercial speech is in a case where the commercial nature of the
speech at issue required closer analysis: Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
240
Corp. In Bolger, the plaintiff challenged a federal statute prohibiting
the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The
plaintiff, who manufactured, sold, and distributed contraceptives,
sought to mail a variety of materials to the general public. Some of
these materials directly promoted the plaintiff’s products, and other
materials were “informational pamphlets discussing the desirability
241
and availability of prophylactics in general.” While the Court found
the materials that explicitly advertised the plaintiff’s products to qualify as commercial speech without much discussion, the informational
242
pamphlets “present[ed] a closer question.”
In evaluating the commercial nature of the informational pamphlets, the Court considered a number of factors: whether the
speech was an advertisement, whether the speech referred to a specific product, and whether the speakers had an economic motivation

235
236
237
238

239
240
241
242

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993).
See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(criticizing the Court’s definition of commercial speech in Central Hudson: “[E]conomic
motivation or impact alone cannot make speech less deserving of constitutional protection, or else all authors and artists who sell their works would be correspondingly disadvantaged”).
Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419.
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
Id. at 62.
Id. at 66.
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243

for engaging in the speech.
The Court ultimately concluded that
since the informational pamphlets combined all three of these characteristics, they fell within the definition of commercial speech, even
though the pamphlets also contained “discussions of important pub244
lic issues such as venereal disease and family planning.” The Court
cautioned, however, that the presence of any one of these factors
alone would be insufficient to render a particular speech act into
commercial speech, and that none of these factors are essential to the
245
definition. The Bolger factors, thus, are neither sufficient nor necessary to the definition of commercial speech. They do, however, at
least articulate a starting place for the analysis.
The Court ultimately appears to be convinced that there is a
246
“common-sense distinction” between commercial speech and fully
protected speech that the courts will be able to recognize on a caseby-case basis. Dean Post argues that this simplistic definition is, in
fact, just the opposite:
The evaluations of “commonsense” are complex, contextual, and ultimately inarticulate; the Court’s appeal to common sense acknowledges
that the achievement of constitutional purposes cannot be reduced to
any simple rule or determinate criteria. The judgments of common
sense ultimately revolve around questions of social meaning; they turn on
whether the utterance of a particular speaker should be understood as an
247
effort to engage public opinion or instead simply to sell products.

This contextual inquiry into the social meaning of a particular speech
act goes beyond the factors articulated in Bolger and requires analyzing the speech act as a whole.
Various scholars have attempted to identify a common thread
uniting the Court’s common-sense inquiry into what qualifies for protection under the commercial speech doctrine. Daniel Halberstam
argues that the Court’s definition of commercial speech depends upon the speech being part of a “predefined communicative project”
248
rather than “unbounded public discourse.”
He believes that the
definition of commercial speech ultimately turns on the relationship
between the speaker and audience. When commercial speech is at
issue, “the relationship between speaker and audience is transformed
from an exploration of each other’s opinions and beliefs into a strat243
244
245
246
247
248

Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67–68 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 66–67 & n.14.
Id. at 64 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 18.
Halberstam, supra note 83, at 832.

592

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:2

egy of striking a bargain that is ultimately objectified in a material
249
He also believes, however, that this relationship
transaction.”
should be evaluated from the perspective of “the reasonable person
receiving the communication . . . . The question would be whether a
person, knowing all the relevant facts, would reasonably understand
the communication to be directed at the audience as potential con250
sumers.” Thus, Halberstam’s formulation evaluates the social context of the relationship between the speaker and his audience, with a
focus on the audience’s perspective.
Others have argued that the commercial speech definition should
focus on the content of the communication:
If the message communicates a point of view or espouses something other than a commercial transaction, it is irrelevant that the speaker hopes
to generate corporate good-will (that may someday lead to sales) in addition to imparting information. If, on the other hand, the message seeks
directly to induce consumption of a particular product or service, it is a
nonexpressive communication entitled to constitutional protection only
to the extent it furthers audience interests, even if the advertiser is pas251
sionately committed to his product or service.

This formulation, however, again focuses on the audience’s perspective: if the audience would understand the speech to be about the
use of a particular product or service, the speech is commercial
speech. The speaker’s ultimate motivations for engaging in the
speech are irrelevant.
Dean Post argues that the Court ultimately defines commercial
speech as those forms of speech that are protected because of their
informational function.
Characterizing commercial speech as
“speech which is not itself public discourse, but which disseminates
information to the public sphere that is useful for the conduct of
252
public discourse,” he argues that the commercial speech doctrine
applies to more than conventional advertising. The doctrine also applies “to state regulations seeking to control the circulation of non253
advertising commercial information outside of public discourse.”
For Post, an integral component of commercial speech is its placement outside of public discourse, defined as “those processes of
communication that must remain open to the participation of citi254
zens if democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.” Under this for249
250
251
252
253
254

Id. at 832–33.
Id. at 853.
Estreicher, supra note 60, at 258–59.
Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 63, at 974.
POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 59, at 41.
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 7.
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mulation, speech that does not explicitly promote the use of a particular product or service can qualify as commercial speech. Here,
again, the focus is not on the speaker’s motivations, but on the content of the particular speech act and the sphere in which it is communicated.
The Ninth Circuit’s discussion in Environmental Defense Center v.
255
EPA illustrates how some courts have dealt with First Amendment
challenges to compelled speech regulations affecting speech that
does not fit within the Court’s narrow definition of commercial
256
speech.
In upholding Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
rules under the Clean Water Act that required small municipal storm
sewer providers to “distribute educational materials to the community . . . about the impacts of storm water discharges on water bodies
and the steps that the public can take to reduce pollutants in storm257
water runoff,” and to “[i]nform public employees, businesses, and
the general public of hazards associated with illegal discharges and
258
improper disposal of waste,” the court first analyzed the applicability of the compelled commercial speech doctrine. The Ninth Circuit
looked to Zauderer, concluding that the EPA rules, similar to Zauderer’s attorney disclosure requirement, did not raise the same interests
259
at stake in Wooley and Barnette. The EPA rules did not interfere with
public discourse, nor require municipal storm sewer providers to
260
adopt any ideological positions with which they disagreed. In fact,
the rules left it up to the municipal storm sewer provider to develop
the specific contents of their informational message: the rules merely
required “appropriate educational and public information activities
261
that need not include any specific speech at all.”
255
256

257
258
259
260

261

344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003).
For an early Seventh Circuit decision interpreting the definition of commercial speech,
see FTC v. Nat’l Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977). In this case, the
Seventh Circuit held that a campaign by the National Commission on Egg Nutrition that
denied the existence of scientific evidence between consumption of eggs and heart disease qualified as commercial speech, even though the Commission was a non-profit, and
the campaign was not connected to any specific brand of eggs.
40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(1)(i) (2011).
Id. at § 122.34(b)(3)(ii)(D).
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 344 F.3d at 849.
Id. at 850 (“Informing the public about safe toxin disposal is non-ideological; it involves
no ‘compelled recitation of a message’ and no ‘affirmation of belief.’” (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980))).
Id. at 849. Since the rules did not specify the content of the compelled speech, there is
no suggestion that the government required the storm sewer providers to spread a normative message about how the public should behave. Instead, the rules require the providers to give the public information about the impact of storm water discharge, how to
reduce pollutants, and the hazards of illegal discharge.
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The court found additional support for its conclusion in National
262
Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell, the Second Circuit case upholding Vermont’s statute requiring manufacturers to label products
containing mercury. The panel concluded that while the municipal
storm sewer providers’ speech was “not . . . ‘commercial’ in the same
sense that manufacturer labeling is . . . it will be similar in substance
to Sorrell to the extent that it informs the public how to dispose safely
263
of toxins.”
The court focused on the informational value of the
speech at issue, and its non-ideological nature, in concluding that the
same principles of the commercial speech doctrine should apply:
“the policy considerations underlying the commercial speech treatment of labeling requirements. . . apply similarly in the context of the
264
market-participant municipal storm sewer provider.” Ultimately the
court’s analysis of the First Amendment rights at stake looks to the
context and content of the speech being compelled—while the court
stopped short of classifying the public information requirement as
compelled commercial speech, it recognized that the principles of
the doctrine should apply in light of the informational interests being
265
served by the EPA rule.
Environmental Defense Center illustrates the problem with a narrow
definition of commercial speech: the government often compels factual disclosures in areas beyond mere proposals of commercial transactions, yet there is no First Amendment doctrine addressing these
types of regulations. So the courts are either required to recognize
the interests of the commercial speech doctrine in applying some
form of reduced First Amendment scrutiny, as the Ninth Circuit did
in Environmental Defense Center, or the courts are forced to fit the regulation within the Court’s confused definition of commercial speech.
A commercial speech definition that focuses on the exchange of
money for the purchase of a product or service fails to recognize that
many of our regulatory policies have goals completely disconnected
266
from economic harm. A broader definition of commercial speech
262
263
264
265

266

!

272 F.3d 104 (2001).
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 344 F.3d at 851 n.27.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit recently relied on Environmental Defense Center in holding that a statute
compelling non-ideological speech by drug claims processors to third-party insurers on
the average fees pharmacies charge for drugs does not trigger any First Amendment scrutiny. Jerry Beeman & Pharm. Servs., Inc. v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 652 F.3d
1085, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 661 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2011), question
certified by 682 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., FUNG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12–13 (listing the purposes of workplace hazard disclosures, toxic releases disclosure, patient safety disclosures, drinking water contaminant
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that looks to the context and content of the speech, and that analyzes
the nature of the speech from the audience’s perspective, would
permit courts to apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to regulations
that compel non-ideological, informational speech outside of the
267
confines of a buyer-seller relationship.
B. Disclosure Laws Targeting Pregnancy Service Centers
268

New laws requiring “pregnancy service centers,” or facilities that
provide services to women who are or may be pregnant, to disclose
the scope and nature of their services present the courts with an opportunity to reconsider the definition of commercial speech. These
laws require the centers to provide factual information to women
seeking pregnancy-related care about the services they provide
and/or the presence of medically trained staff. As will be discussed
further below, the laws were adopted in response to evidence showing
that women visiting the centers are often confused about what types
of services the centers provide, and that this confusion can delay their
access to time-sensitive medical care. While these disclosures are designed to provide information that will prevent the deception and
confusion of women seeking pregnancy-related medical care, courts
that have considered First Amendment challenges to the laws have
concluded that the commercial speech doctrine is inapplicable based

267

268

disclosures, restaurant hygiene disclosures, nutritional labeling disclosures, and automobile rollover disclosures).
Before turning to an application of the proposed definition, it is important to distinguish
the commercial speech doctrine from the First Amendment right of corporations and
other commercial actors to participate in public discourse. The commercial speech definition focuses on the characteristics of a particular speech act, not the commercial status
of its speaker. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980) (concluding that individuals seeking charitable contributions are engaged in fully
protected speech, even though they are soliciting money). Thus, while the government
may not suppress political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity under Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010), this holding in no way limits the government’s
ability to regulate a corporation’s speech promoting its products and services.
These centers are commonly referred to in the media and by pro-choice advocates as “crisis pregnancy centers.” Although the centers used to refer to themselves as “crisis pregnancy centers,” they now avoid using the term, and some prefer the term “pregnancy resource center.” MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., FALSE
AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY
RESOURCE CENTERS 1 (2006), available at http://www.chsourcebook.com/articles/ waxman2.pdf [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT]. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the
centers as “pregnancy service centers,” which is the term used in the New York City Local
Law. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-815. The Baltimore Ordinance refers to these types
of facilities as “limited-service pregnancy centers.” BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-501
(2012).
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on a single characteristic: the centers do not charge money for their
services.
1. The Background Behind Pregnancy Service Center Disclosure Laws
Pregnancy service centers, as the term is used in this Article, are
facilities that provide women who are or may be pregnant with certain services, such as free pregnancy tests, ultrasounds, counseling,
maternity education, and free non-financial assistance (such as dia269
The centers often do not have
pers, formula, clothes, and toys).
any licensed medical providers on staff, and are not licensed as medi270
cal clinics. Most of the centers are affiliated with pro-life organiza271
tions, and they do not provide referrals for emergency contraception or abortions. Their explicit goal is to persuade pregnant women
272
and teenagers to choose motherhood or adoption over abortion.
These types of centers are neither a new nor a limited phenomenon; it was estimated that there were approximately 2100 pregnancy
273
service centers in the mid-1980s, and it is estimated that there are
274
currently 2500 to 4000 such centers across the country. These types
of centers have long been criticized for misrepresenting themselves as
abortion clinics and engaging in deceptive advertising that leads
women to believe that the centers provide a more full-range of medi275
cal services. And both governmental and private actors have previously attempted to curb the centers’ deceptive tactics. As just a few
examples: New York State’s Attorney General charged centers with

269
270

271

272
273
274
275

See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 202–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(listing the types of services provided by centers in New York City).
NARAL PRO-CHOICE N.Y. FOUND., “SHE SAID ABORTION COULD CAUSE BREAST CANCER,” A
REPORT ON: THE LIES, MANIPULATIONS, AND PRIVACY VIOLATIONS OF CRISIS PREGNANCY
CENTERS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.prochoiceny.org/
assets/bin/pdfs/cpcreport2010.pdf [hereinafter NARAL REPORT] (noting that most
pregnancy service centers are not medical clinics and that most have staff without any
medical training).
WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 268, at 1. Two of the largest of such national umbrella organizations are Heartbeat International and Care Net. Both organizations describe
themselves as pro-life networks that promote the work of pregnancy service centers
providing
alternatives
to
abortion.
See
HEARTBEAT
INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.hearbeatinternational.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2012); About Us, CARE NET,
http://www.care-net.org/aboutus/mission.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 268, at 1.
See Joseph Berger, Centers’ Abortion Ads Called ‘Bogus,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1986, at B2.
Joanne Rosen, The Public Health Risks of Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 44 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 201 (2012).
See Jane Gross, Pregnancy Centers: Anti-Abortion Role Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at
B1.
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276

deceptive advertising in the 1980s and investigated their deceptive
277
tactics again in 2002, entering into a settlement agreement; in the
mid-1980s, a North Dakota women’s medical clinic sued a pregnancy
service center for damages and injunctive relief on account of the
278
center’s false and deceptive advertising; in the late 1980s, the State
of Texas charged a center with violating the state’s deceptive trade
279
practices act; in the late 1980s, a private plaintiff in Missouri sued a
center under Section 1983 for participating in a conspiracy to deprive
280
her of her fundamental right to an abortion; and in the mid-1990s,
Planned Parenthood filed suit against a San Diego clinic for decep281
tive advertising.
Criticism of the centers’ deceptive tactics, however, has continued,
culminating in a 2006 report by the Minority Staff of the Committee
on Government Reform in the U.S. House of Representatives entitled
“False and Misleading Health Information Provided by Federally
282
Funded Pregnancy Resource Centers.”
This report, requested by
U.S. Representative Henry Waxman, found that 87% of the centers
investigated “provided false or misleading information about the
health effects of abortion,” and that the centers often “grossly mis283
represented the medical risks of abortion.”
The report also describes how the centers “often mask their pro-life mission in order to
attract abortion-vulnerable clients,” and that their tactics include “obscuring the fact that the center does provide referrals to abortions” in
their advertisements, and misrepresenting that the center will “provide pregnant teenagers and women with an understanding of all of
284
their options.”
285
A host of other reports have provided further documentation of
286
continued deception by crisis pregnancy centers. First, the centers

276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

286

!

Id.
Nancy Tilghman, Anti-Abortion Centers Get Spitzer Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at 7.
Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1986).
Mother & Unborn Baby Care of N. Tex. v. Texas, 749 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App. 1988).
Lewis v. Pearson Found., 908 F.2d 318, 319 (8th Cir. 1990).
Tamar Lewin, Anti-Abortion Center’s Ads Ruled Misleading, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at A15.
WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 268.
Id. at i.
Id. at 1–2.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF N.Y.C., CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTER SURVEYING SUMMARY (2011)
[hereinafter PPNYC REPORT]; NARAL REPORT, supra note 270; NAT’L ABORTION FED’N,
CRISIS PREGNANCY CTRS.:
AN AFFRONT TO CHOICE 3 (2006), available at
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/public_policy/cpc_r
eport.pdf.
See Rosen, supra note 274, at 201 (concluding that “the centers often provide inaccurate
information that may delay or interfere with women’s access to abortion and contracep-
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disguise the true nature of the services they will provide in order to
lure women to the clinic. Second, once women are at the clinic, the
centers provide them with false and misleading information. For example, the reports indicate that centers often have ambiguous names
287
that confuse women about the nature of their services, locate next
to abortion providers in the hopes that women seeking an abortion
288
will accidentally go into the pregnancy services center, and even go
so far as to intercept women on their way to abortion clinics to direct
289
them to the pregnancy service center instead. Once women are at
the clinic, the reports document that some centers have inaccurately
290
diagnosed the stage of women’s pregnancies, given women false information about how long they could wait before deciding whether to
291
have an abortion, and informed women that they will be able to obtain an abortion at the pregnancy service center, without any inten292
tion of ever providing them with such a service.
In recent years, local governments have used a new tactic: disclosure laws that require pregnancy service centers to post signs and/or
include written disclosures in their advertisements informing women
about which services the centers will not provide, and/or whether the
center is a licensed medical provider. Laws requiring pregnancy services centers to make some type of disclosure have been enacted in
293
294
Baltimore, Maryland; Montgomery County, Maryland; New York
295
296
City; and Austin, Texas.

287
288
289
290
291
292

293
294

295
296

!

tion, improperly influence women’s reproductive health decisions, and potentially increase the number of unintended births”).
NARAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 6 (giving the example of “neutral sounding names like
Pregnancy Help, Inc., Pregnancy Resources Services, and Center for Pregnant Women”).
Id. at 7–8.
PPNYC REPORT, supra note 285, at 6–7.
Id. at 5.
NARAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 10–11.
PPNYC REPORT, supra note 285, at 1 (reporting that 60% of respondents indicated that
the pregnancy service center visited did not make clear whether the center provided
abortions, and that “[a]t least two women reported being told that the CPC could perform an abortion, thereafter being made to wait for numerous weeks to find out that the
CPC did not perform abortions”).
BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-502 (2012).
MONTGOMERY CNTY. COUNCIL, MD., RES. 16-1252 (2010). This resolution requires “limited service pregnancy resource centers” to post a sign disclosing that the center does not
have a licensed medical professional on staff, and that the Montgomery County health officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health
care provider. Id.
N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816.
AUSTIN, TEX., CODE § 10-9-2 (2010). In April of 2010, the Austin City Council adopted
this law, which requires “limited service pregnancy centers” to post a sign at their entrance informing visitors that the center does not provide for or refer for abortions or
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2. Baltimore and New York City’s Disclosure Laws
This Article will focus on the disclosure laws enacted in two cities:
Baltimore and New York. Pregnancy service centers challenged both
cities’ laws on First Amendment grounds as impermissibly infringing
on the centers’ right to free speech. And in both cases, the district
courts enjoined the laws, applying strict scrutiny after concluding that
297
the commercial speech doctrine was inapplicable.
While the New
York City law is currently before the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary in-

297

FDA-approved birth control drugs and medical devices. In January of 2012, in response
to a legal challenge to the ordinance, the City Council repealed this ordinance and replaced it with a new law that requires the centers to post a sign that indicates whether the
center has a licensed health care practitioner that provides or supervises the provision of
services, and whether the center is licensed to provide medical services. AUSTIN, TEX.,
CODE § 10-10-2 (2011). San Francisco has also adopted a law targeting pregnancy service
centers, but San Francisco’s ordinance does not compel any speech. Instead, San Francisco’s ordinance prohibits “limited services pregnancy centers” from engaging in untruthful or misleading advertising, and permits the San Francisco City Attorney to enforce
its terms. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 93.4–5 (2011). While not compelling any speech,
San Francisco’s ordinance is still being challenged as an unconstitutional restriction of
pregnancy service centers’ First Amendment rights. See Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 2, First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, No. 11-5534 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2011).
Evergreen Ass’n Inc. v. New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); O’Brien v.
Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. Md. 2011). Montgomery County’s resolution
was also challenged and preliminarily enjoined on First Amendment grounds. See Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472 (D. Md. 2011). In Tepeyac the County
defendants did not take a definitive position in the litigation as to whether the resolution
applied to commercial speech. The district court’s commercial speech analysis in Tepeyac
is similar to the analysis in the Baltimore and New York decisions, and will not be discussed at length. The court applied strict scrutiny after concluding that the centers were
not engaged in commercial speech. Importantly, while applying strict scrutiny, the district court did not preliminarily enjoin the resolution’s requirement that the centers post
a sign indicating that the center does not have a licensed medical professional on staff,
but did enjoin the requirement that the centers post a sign informing women that the
County Health Officer recommends that pregnant women contact a licensed medical
professional. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the first disclosure requirement violated strict scrutiny. Id. at 471–72. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed in part, and reversed in part. Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d 591 (4th
Cir. 2012). The majority of the Fourth Circuit panel concluded that both parts of the
Montgomery County resolution should have been preliminarily enjoined, as even the
statement about the presence of a medical professional violated strict scrutiny. In the majority’s view, this disclaimer “suggests to potential clients that the center is not to be trusted and that a pregnancy center’s services, like religious counseling or job placement assistance, will usually be inferior to those offered by medical professionals.” Id. at 594.
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298

junction, over a vigorous dissent by Judge King.
The Fourth Cir299
cuit’s decision will be reheard en banc later this year.
First, a brief summary of each law. Baltimore’s law applies to “limited-service pregnancy centers,” defined as “any person . . . whose
300
primary purpose is to provide pregnancy-related services,” and who
provides information about pregnancy-related services but does not
provide or refer for (1) abortions, or (2) nondirective and compre301
hensive birth control services. The city requires all centers meeting
this definition to post a sign in their waiting room that informs clients that “the center does not provide or make referral for abortion
302
or birth-control services.”
New York City’s ordinance applies to facilities that have a primary
purpose of providing services to women who are or may be pregnant,
and that either (1) offer obstetric ultrasounds, sonograms, or prena303
tal care, or (2) have the appearance of being a licensed medical fa304
cility. The ordinance lists six factors that courts should consider in
evaluating whether a pregnancy service center has the appearance of
a licensed medical facility. The factors to be considered are whether
the pregnancy service center:
(a) offers pregnancy testing and/or pregnancy diagnosis; (b) has staff or
volunteers who wear medical attire or uniforms; (c) contains one or
more examination tables; (d) contains a private or semi-private room or
area containing medical supplies and/or medical instruments; (e) has
staff or volunteers who collect health insurance information from clients;
and (f) is located on the same premises as a licensed medical facility or
305
provider or shares facility space with a licensed medical provider.

If a given facility meets two or more of these factors, the ordinance
declares this to be prima facie evidence that the center has the appearance of a licensed medical facility. The ordinance explicitly does
not apply to any facility that is actually licensed to provide medical

298
299

300
301
302
303

304
305

Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 683 F.3d 539, 560 (4th
Cir. 2012).
Court Order, Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d 543 (Nos. 11-1111, 111185) (Dkt. No. 120) (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (granting rehearing en banc and scheduling oral argument for Dec. of 2012).
BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-501 (2012).
Id.
Id. at § 3-502(A).
Prenatal care is defined in explicitly medical terms: “services consisting of physical examination, pelvic examination or clinical laboratory services provided to a woman during
pregnancy.” N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-815(i).
Id. at § 20-815(g).
Id.
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care, or that has a licensed medical provider present to provide or
306
supervise the provision of services.
A facility meeting the New York city ordinance’s definition must
disclose whether the center has a licensed medical provider on staff;
whether the center provides or refers for abortions, emergency contraception and prenatal care; and that the NYC Department of
Health recommends that women who are or may be pregnant contact
307
a licensed medical professional.
These disclosures must be made:
(1) on a sign in the entranceway and waiting room of the center; (2)
in any of the center’s advertisements; and (3) orally to any woman
who requests an abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal
308
care.
Thus, while Baltimore’s law imposes a more modest disclosure requirement, both in its content and format, New York City’s applies to
a more limited set of centers, those that provide medical-type services
or otherwise have the appearance of being a licensed medical facility,
but that are not actually licensed as medical clinics.
3. The Courts’ Commercial Speech Analysis
In determining whether the centers were engaged in commercial
speech, both district courts and the majority of the Fourth Circuit
panel cited to Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. as holding that
commercial speech is speech that “does no more than propose a
309
commercial transaction,” and to Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
310
v. Public Service Commission’s definition of commercial speech as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
311
and its audience.”

306
307
308
309

310
311

Id.
Id. at § 20-816.
Id.
Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt.,
683 F.3d 539, 553 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 66 (1983)) (stating that the “hallmark” of commercial speech is that it does “no more
than propose a commercial transaction”); O’Brien v. Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804,
813 (D. Md. 2011) (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64–68) (“The Supreme Court has defined
commercial speech as speech that proposes a commercial transaction.”).
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (quoting Conn. Bar Ass’n, 620 F.3d at 94) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, 683 F.3d at 553
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980)); O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 813 (quoting Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561).
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These courts, however, completely ignored the Supreme Court’s
discussion in Bolger of the factors bearing on whether a certain speech
act qualifies as commercial speech: whether the speech is an advertisement, whether the speech refers to a specific product, and whether the speakers have an economic motivation for engaging in the
312
speech. Instead, the courts focused their analysis on one fact: the
centers’ lack of financial interest or motivation. As the O’Brien District Court said in evaluating Baltimore’s law:
The overall purpose of the advertisements, services, and information offered by the CENTER is not to propose a commercial transaction, nor is
it related to the CENTER’s economic interest. The CENTER engages in
speech relating to abortion and birth-control based on strongly held religious and political beliefs rather than commercial interests or profit mo313
tives.

The majority of the Fourth Circuit panel in Greater Baltimore agreed
with the district court’s analysis, concluding that while the fact that
the centers provide free services is not necessarily dispositive:
[I]t becomes so in this case because there is no indication that the Pregnancy Center is motivated by any economic interest or that it is proposing any commercial transaction. The Pregnancy Center seeks to provide
free information about pregnancy, abortion, and birth control as informed by a religious and political belief. This kind of ideologically driven speech has routinely been afforded the highest levels of First
314
Amendment protection . . . .

The district court drew a similar conclusion in analyzing New York’s
law: “the offer of free services such as pregnancy tests in furtherance
of a religious belief does not propose a commercial transaction . . . . [n]or do Plaintiffs offer pregnancy-related services in fur315
therance of their economic interests.”
According to these courts,
since the operators of the pregnancy service centers intend and believe themselves to be engaging in religious speech, their speech is
per se non-commercial.
By solely focusing on the underlying religious and ideological motivations of the pregnancy service centers, the courts have failed to
appreciate, or even consider, the perspective of the audience for the
centers’ speech: women who are or may be pregnant. For women
seeking pregnancy-related services, the centers are a service-provider
competing with other organizations, including full-service medical
clinics, that very likely do charge a fee for their services. These courts
312
313
314
315

Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67.
O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, 683 F.3d at 553–54.
Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
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dismissed the relevance of the fact that the services provided by the
316
centers “have value in the commercial marketplace,” concluding
that such reasoning would mean that “any house of worship offering
their congregants sacramental wine, communion wafers, prayer
beads, or other objects with commercial value, would find their accompanying speech subject to diminished constitutional protec317
tion.” However, there is an important distinction between churches
offering their congregants items that have a commercial value during
religious services and pregnancy service centers offering to provide
women with pregnancy tests, ultrasounds, and options counseling:
individuals do not go to church to get wine, and if they do, they are
well-aware that the wine will be served alongside a heavy dose of religious speech. In contrast, women who visit pregnancy service centers
are, in many cases, unaware of the centers’ religious motivations and
are visiting the centers in order to receive the services advertised.
The fact that speech is religiously motivated does not mean that
such speech should be completely immunized from state regulation
or judicial review. While the First Amendment prohibits the state
from regulating one’s religious beliefs, it does not protect fraudulent
318
319
or criminal speech, even if it is religiously motivated. Looking to
the Court’s jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause, “an individual’s religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
320
regulate.” An organization’s religious motivations do not mean that
it can engage in fraud or violate valid laws prohibiting fraudulent and
criminal conduct. Nor should a group’s religious motivations mean
that all of its speech, even speech promoting the use of a product

316

317

318

319

320

O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 813. See also Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67) (“[A]n organization does not propose a ‘commercial transaction’
simply by offering a good or service that has economic value.”).
O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 814. See also Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, 683
F.3d at 554; Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (quoting O’Brien, 768 F. Supp. 2d at
814).
See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547–48 (2012) (discussing historical exclusions of First Amendment protection for fraudulent or criminal speech that results in a
legally cognizable harm); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1580 (2010) (“Since its
enactment, the First Amendment has permitted restrictions on a few historic categories of
speech—including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct . . . .”) (citations omitted); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs.,
538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”).
See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for the Unification of World Christianity, 762 P.2d 46,
57–58 (Cal. 1988) (collecting cases imposing tort liability for religiously motivated conduct).
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
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with commercial value, is per se religious speech that lies outside the
commercial speech doctrine.
Consider the following hypotheticals: A religious group that seeks
to convert vegetarians into meat-eaters as part of the group’s religious
mission opens a non-profit organization, next to a vegetarian supermarket, called “Just Like Meat” and gives away free “hot dogs” that
are advertised on its signs as tasting “Just Like the Real Thing!” However, the hot dogs taste just like the real thing because they are made
with beef. Suppose a state had evidence that many vegetarians were
mislead into thinking that the free hot dogs were made with an imitation meat product and were deeply distraught and angered when
they found out that the group was giving out hot dogs made with
beef. Or, to take the analogy even further, suppose the state also had
evidence that individuals who were allergic to beef had ingested the
hot dogs and had suffered severe allergic reactions as a consequence.
Should the state be prohibited from requiring the store to post a sign
indicating that the store serves products made with real meat merely
because the group’s conduct is religiously motivated and the hot dogs
are given away for free?
What if a religious group opposed to blood transfusions set up a
non-profit organization called the “Sickle Cell Anemia Treatments
Options Center” that advertised itself as providing counseling, support, and medical services to those with sickle cell anemia, and that
appeared to most visitors to be a medical clinic? Suppose this organization did not have any actual medical providers on staff, counseled
all clients that blood transfusions would only harm their health, and
showed clients shocking photos and videos of death and disease
caused by blood transfusions. Suppose that some visitors to the organization believed that they had visited a medical clinic and delayed
in getting necessary medical treatment as a result. Does the fact that
the organization does not charge for its services mean that its speech
is per se non-commercial? Should the state be prohibited from requiring the “Sickle Cell Anemia Treatments Options Center” to post
a sign informing potential visitors that the center is not a licensed
medical clinic, and does not provide blood transfusions? In both of
these hypotheticals, the audience for the speech is unaware of the
underlying religious motivations and believes that the organization
provides goods and services like any other commercial service provider.
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4. A More In-Depth Commercial Speech Analysis
As discussed previously, the Court has not given a clear method
for analyzing whether a particular speech act qualifies as commercial
speech. The pregnancy service center disclosure laws, which assuredly affect speech that lies outside the range of the “core notion of
321
commercial speech,” challenge the courts to grapple with this doctrine and its nuances. Unfortunately, the courts discussed above engaged in a cursory and superficial analysis of whether the centers’
speech met the Court’s definition. By undertaking a more in-depth
analysis of whether the commercial speech doctrine applies to the
pregnancy service center disclosure laws, I hope, in this section, to
identify a workable method of identifying commercial speech that
can be applied in a wide variety of contexts.
This is not to say that a precise set of finite characteristics must be
present in order for something to qualify as commercial speech. As
Dean Post notes, “the impossibility of specifying the parameters that
define the category of commercial speech has haunted its jurispru322
dence and scholarship,” and I do not suggest that commercial
speech has easily identifiable attributes. Instead, I believe that a multi-factor approach, such as that advocated in Bolger, is necessary in order to ensure that the doctrine targets the appropriate speech acts. I
propose a test that incorporates the Bolger factors and asks the courts
to analyze the speech’s context and content, as well as the perspective
of the reasonable person receiving the communication. Such a test
recognizes that since the First Amendment values and protects the
informational interests of the audience of commercial speech, the
definition of what qualifies as commercial speech should take the audience’s perspective into account. In order to determine whether a
particular speech act qualifies as commercial speech, the courts
should analyze: (1) the content of the speech: whether the speech
proposes a commercial transaction, and/or refers to the use of a particular product or service; and (2) the context of the speech: whether the speech is in the commercial marketplace or is instead part of
public discourse, the commercial interests of the speaker, the relationship between the speaker and the audience, and the reasonable
323
audience member’s perspective on the speech’s context. An organization that desires to spread a religious or political message should
321
322
323

Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 7.
This proposed test for how to define commercial speech is not limited to laws that compel commercial speech, although that will be my focus in this article.
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not be able to disguise the social meaning of its speech by pretending
to be a commercial actor while simultaneously claiming that this
speech rests outside the commercial speech doctrine.
This approach aligns with that taken by Judge King in his dissenting opinion in the Fourth Circuit’s review of the Baltimore ordinance. Judge King noted the Court’s historical difficulty in defining
324
commercial speech, and looked specifically to the Court’s discussion in Bolger of the multiple factors that must be considered when
evaluating whether a given speech act qualifies as commercial
325
speech.
Importantly, Judge King made clear that “context mat326
ters” when engaging in this inquiry, and that “[f]rom a First
Amendment free speech perspective, that context includes the viewpoint of the listener, for ‘[c]ommercial expression not only serves the
economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of in327
formation.’” In short, Judge King advocated the exact kind of contextual inquiry presented in this Article, and the Fourth Circuit may
well adopt Judge King’s preferred approach when it rehears the case
328
en banc.
Applying this kind of contextual inquiry to the pregnancy service
center disclosure laws illustrates the inadequacy of relying on a single
factor, the speaker’s economic motivation, in defining what constitutes commercial speech. The commercial nature of the pregnancy
service centers’ speech becomes much more complicated when one
engages in a more three-dimensional inquiry.
a. The Content of the Speech
By first evaluating the actual content of the speech at issue, we can
focus in on the speech act, as opposed to the motivations of the
speaker. Speech that proposes a commercial transaction, rather than
expressing the speaker’s ideological beliefs, evokes the Court’s con329
ception of core commercial speech.
In Zauderer, the Court notes
324

325
326
327
328

329

Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 683 F.3d 539, 567 (4th
Cir. 2012) (King, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court has long grappled with the concept of commercial speech.”).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 569.
Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–62
(1980)).
See Court Order, Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d 543 (Nos. 11-1111,
11-1185) (Dkt. No. 120) (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (granting rehearing en banc and scheduling oral argument for Dec. of 2012).
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
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that while it is difficult to identify the precise boundaries of the
commercial speech definition, “it is clear enough that the speech at
issue in this case—advertising pure and simple—falls within those
330
bounds.” But speech need not take the form of a traditional commercial advertisement in order for it to qualify as commercial speech.
331
In Bolger, the Court held that the “reference to a specific product”
was one of the factors weighing in favor of classifying the speech at
332
issue as commercial speech.
Thus, while the mere reference to a
given product clearly does not commercialize a given speech act, this
is still relevant to the analysis. And by focusing on the content of the
speech, we can determine how the reasonable audience member
would interpret the speech regardless of the speaker’s motivations for
engaging in the speech.
Looking to the content of the pregnancy service centers’ speech,
we must first determine whether the compelled speech requirements
impact the centers’ ideological speech, or just their offer of services.
The content of the centers’ speech when meeting with women is often overtly ideological: the center staff and volunteers engage in advocacy expressing their opposition to abortion and birth control.
However, the disclosure laws apply to a more limited aspect of the
centers’ speech. Both Baltimore’s and New York’s laws require disclosures, in the form of signs, to be placed in the centers’ waiting
333
rooms. New York’s law goes further, requiring the disclosures to be
included in the centers’ advertisements, and requiring a second sign
334
outside the pregnancy service center.
All of these requirements
impact the centers’ speech offering services, not the centers’ speech
335
The disclosure reonce a woman is meeting with a staff member.
quirement does not affect the centers’ ability to engage in ideological

330

331
332

333
334
335

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). In Virginia Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, the Court describes commercial advertising
as the “dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for
what reason, and at what price.” 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66.
See id. (noting that the reference to a specific product was one of the “characteristics”
supporting the classification of the speech at issue as commercial speech); see also Va. Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (stating that ordinarily in commercial speech, “the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service”).
BALT., MD., HEALTH CODE § 3-502(a) (2012); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816
(f)(1)(ii).
Id. at (f)(1)(i), (f)(1)(iii).
New York’s law has one additional requirement that goes further, requiring the disclosures to be made if a woman requests birth control, an abortion, or prenatal care. N.Y.C.,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816 (f)(2). This particular requirement will be discussed infra pp.
612–13.
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advocacy. Thus, in evaluating the content of the centers’ speech, the
analysis should focus on the centers’ speech offering services to women who are or may be pregnant.
Looking to New York’s requirement that the centers include the
disclosure in their advertisements, it is clear that the content of the
centers’ advertisements falls within the ‘core notion’ of commercial
speech: the advertisements offer the availability of particular services.
Although these services may be provided free of charge, the advertisements are otherwise indistinguishable from an advertisement by
any service-provider. The advertisements do not spread the centers’
ideological or religious messages, nor do the advertisements discuss a
336
matter of public concern:
the advertisements inform women who
are or may be pregnant of the availability of certain services at the
pregnancy service center. The content of the advertisements weighs
in favor of classifying the centers’ speech as commercial speech.
A more complicated question is posed by the signage disclosure
requirements, which affect the centers’ general offer of services,
without targeting a specific speech act per se. The signage requirements are somewhat analogous to compelled labeling on product
packaging: the pregnancy service center is being required to carry a
label informing potential clients of the services provided. Moreover,
the signage disclosure requirements can be tied to the centers’ own
signage, which informs women of the name and location of the pregnancy service center. To the extent that the centers’ name and signage represent the center as a medical service-provider, rather than an
entity with an ideological mission, the content of this speech is also
commercial. The Court has previously held that a trade name quali337
fies as commercial speech, and the evidence suggests that many
centers use ambiguous names that do not convey the limited nature
338
Although New York contains the additional reof their services.
quirement that disclosures be made orally upon the request of certain services, again the content of the speech that is being affected is
the request and offer of services, not the centers’ ideological speech.

336

337

338

Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that an advertisement
that “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern” did not qualify as a
commercial advertisement).
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (holding that optometrists’ use of trade names
qualified as commercial speech and could be regulated by the state because of the “significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the public”).
NARAL REPORT, supra note 270, at 6.
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b. The Context of the Speech
The format and forum of a particular speech act matters, as does
the identity of the speaker and his audience, and the nature of their
relationship. In fact, the Court has given us an example of how to
evaluate whether a given speech act’s context indicates that it is
339
commercial speech. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, a case that predates
the commercial speech doctrine, the Court engaged in a contextual
inquiry in evaluating whether Jehovah’s Witnesses were engaged in
commercial speech when they went door–to–door explaining their
religious views and soliciting people to purchase religious books and
340
pamphlets for less than twenty-five cents:
[T]he mere fact that the religious literature is “sold” by itinerant preachers rather than ‘donated’ does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in
church would make the church service a commercial project. The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the
spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing
retailers or wholesalers of books . . . On this record it plainly cannot be
said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial rather than a reli341
gious venture.

As Dean Post notes, the Court’s analysis in Murdock “does not focus
on the narrow communicative act of selling a Bible, but rather on the
larger ‘venture’ or ‘activity’ within which the particular communica342
tive act is embedded.” The Court looks to the social meaning of the
type of speech at issue: “The hand distribution of religious tracts is
an age-old form of missionary evangelism. . . . It is more than preaching. It is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combi343
nation of both.”
The speech at issue was deeply tied to religious
practices—it would be clear to any listener that the solicitation was
part of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious mission. Importantly, the
Court does not simply conclude that the speech is religious because
the Jehovah’s Witnesses themselves intend to engage in religious
speech. Instead, the Court’s language evokes its later characterization of the “commonsense” distinctions between commercial speech
344
and other speech.
In Murdock, a commonsense analysis of the
339
340
341
342
343
344

!

319 U.S. 105 (1943).
The books were twenty-five cents each, and the pamphlets were five cents each. Id. at
107.
Id. at 110–11.
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 16.
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108–09.
See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (“We have not discarded the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transac-
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speech, given its context and format, indicated that the speech was
fundamentally different from a door-to-door salesman advocating the
purchase of a particular book.
Consider, for example, if the Jehovah’s Witnesses had instead
concealed their religion from their listeners and simply offered to sell
them “self-help” books for twenty-five cents. While the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ ultimate motivation for speaking might still be religious in
this hypothetical scenario, the alteration of the circumstances surrounding their speech would assuredly have affected the Court’s
analysis of whether the Jehovah’s Witnesses were engaged in religious
speech.
The Court’s reasoning in Murdock makes clear that
“[c]onstitutional characterization of the act of solicitation depends
345
on its context.”
If we evaluate the context and social meaning of the pregnancy
service centers’ speech, instead of simply focusing on the centers’
lack of financial motivation, the analysis looks much different from
that undertaken by both district courts and the Fourth Circuit panel
majority. The offer of pregnancy testing, ultrasounds, or pregnancy
346
counseling is not, in Murdock’s terms, a “clearly religious activity.”
The context of this speech, irrespective of whether any money is
charged, is one of service-provision. Many other institutions, such as
347
full-service medical clinics, provide the same services. In fact, some
348
The
medical clinics also provide pregnancy tests free of charge.
pregnancy service centers are acting like any other service provider:
their speech targets a specific audience, women who are or may be
pregnant, and offers the availability of certain services that have an
economic value in the marketplace. The evidence suggests that
women visiting the centers often believe that they are visiting a medical clinic, and are unaware that the centers have ideological motiva349
tions for providing women with pregnancy-related services.
While
the pregnancy service centers’ lack of economic motivation is rele-

345
346
347

348

349

tion, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other
varieties of speech.”).
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 16.
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111.
See, e.g., Health Info & Services, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.planned
parenthood.org/health-center/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (describing services provided
by Planned Parenthood).
See Health Info & Services: Boro Hall Center—Brooklyn, NY, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-center/centerDetails.asp?f=2522&a=0&
v=details (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) (“Free pregnancy tests by walk-in or appointment . . . .”).
See, e.g., PPNYC REPORT, supra note 285, at 3–6 (reporting stories of women who mistakenly went to pregnancy service centers).
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350

vant, the overall context of the speech is still the offer of services in
the commercial marketplace, not ideological speech in public discourse.
If the pregnancy service centers, however, did actually make clear
in their advertisements and signage that their central goal is to engage in religious and ideological advocacy about the sanctity of human life, this would assuredly affect the contextual analysis of their
speech, as this would affect the audience’s perspective on whether
the centers are just another service provider. If pregnancy service
centers were clear about their motivations, the audience for their
speech would be aware that the pregnancy service centers are not just
providing services to pregnant women, and that the centers intend to
advocate their ideological beliefs. Thus, in the contextual analysis,
the visibility of the centers’ ideological motivations to its audience
matters, not just what the centers claim their motivations to be. It is
the disguising of the centers’ religious and ideological motivations
that weighs in favor of classifying their speech as commercial speech.
The centers’ efforts to engage in religious and ideological speech
are certainly relevant to the commercial speech analysis. As the
Court said in Riley, “[o]ur lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny
to apply to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech
taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement there351
on.” Here, however, the disclosures do not impact the centers’ abil352
The disclosures merely inity to engage in ideological advocacy.

350

351
352

!

For example, the Court has made clear that a speaker who does have economic motivations for engaging in speech cannot immunize his speech from the commercial speech
doctrine by “including reference to public issues.” Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983).
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
The District of Maryland, without much analysis, concluded that the mandated signage
meant that “[c]ontemporaneous with the center’s initial communication is the presence
of a stark and immediate statement about abortion and birth control,” and that this
statement “alters the course of a center’s communications with a client or prospective client about abortion and birth-control.” O’Brien v. Mayor of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804,
814 (D. Md. 2011). It is unclear how the statement that these services are not provided in
any way alters the centers’ ability to convey their ideological message. In fact, one study
has found that informing women about the ideology of a pro-life center, which goes
much further than the New York and Baltimore requirements that the centers inform
women about the scope of their services, had no effect on women’s decision-making.
Kathryn Mardirosian et al., The Effects of Enhanced Informed Consent in a Pro-Life Pregnancy
Counseling Center, 69 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 39, 40 (1990). This study examined the effects
of telling women that the center they were visiting was pro-life, that the counselors and
staff advocated a pro-life philosophy, that they might be shown a graphic videotape of an
abortion, and that staff members were trained volunteers and not professional counselors. A control group was not told any of this information. The study found no signifi-
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form women what services they will be unable to receive at the center,
curing any misconceptions they may have had about the types of ser353
In contrast, in Riley, the Court concluded that the
vices provided.
law requiring professional fundraisers to disclose the percentage they
retained as a fee was inextricably intertwined with the fundraiser’s
ideological advocacy because of the “reality that without solicitation
354
the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.” The
collection and solicitation of money at issue in Riley was integral to
the charitable organizations’ ability to engage in advocacy, and the
Court concluded that the ordinance would “almost certainly hamper
the legitimate efforts of professional fundraisers to raise money for
355
the charities they represent.”
Here, however, the disclosures only
prevent the centers from engaging in illegitimate efforts: the centers
cannot mislead women into thinking that they are visiting a medical
clinic that provides abortions or emergency contraception. There is
nothing inextricable about the centers’ offer to provide pregnancy356
related services and their ideological advocacy. Thus, analyzing the
effect of the compelled statements on the centers’ speech as a whole
suggests that the laws only impact the commercial aspect of the centers’ speech.
New York’s law, however, contains an additional requirement that
impacts the centers’ one-on-one conversations with individual wom-

353

354
355
356

cant difference between the groups in their intent to abort after the meeting with the
pro-life counselors.
This discussion is limited to the Baltimore ordinance and the first two disclosures required by New York City’s ordinance. The third disclosure required by the New York ordinance, that the New York City Department of Health recommends that women who are
or may be pregnant contact a licensed medical professional, goes beyond merely correcting misconceptions about the services the centers provide. I will discuss New York City’s
third disclosure in more detail in the next section. Building off of the analysis of the
graphic tobacco labels, I conclude that the third disclosure requires the centers to repeat
the state’s normative message, and thus falls outside of “factual and uncontroversial information.” N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816.
Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
Id. at 799.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in analyzing whether Tupperware parties that
included discussions of home economics and financial responsibility qualified as commercial speech. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, based on Riley, that the
noncommercial aspects of the presentations were intertwined with the commercial aspects: “there is nothing whatever ‘inextricable’ about the noncommercial aspects of these presentations. No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares.
Nothing in the resolution prevents the speaker from conveying, or the audience from
hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the nature of things requires
them to be combined with commercial messages.” Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
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en: the centers must also make the mandated disclosures orally if a
woman requests an abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal
357
care. The ordinance makes clear that the disclosure must be made
whenever a client or prospective client makes such an oral request for
358
these services, whether in person or on the phone. While the oral
disclosures, in the context of a telephone conversation with a prospective client, target the same “offer of services” discussed previously, a staff member will also be required to make these disclosures if a
woman requests these services during her appointment. The oral
disclosure, therefore, may have to be said alongside the centers’ ideological speech, and while the content of this speech is commercial,
the context of the speech is much more ideological once a woman is
meeting with the centers’ staff. While this requirement poses a closer
question, analyzing the impact of the compelled statement on the
centers’ ideological speech leads to the same conclusion reached
above: the compelled speech prevents the centers from lying about
which services are provided and whether a medical provider is on
staff. Presumably, any woman who requests these services during her
appointment is under the mistaken impression that she is in the office of a non-ideologically motivated medical service provider. The
disclosure still targets the centers’ offer of services by requiring staff
members to provide additional information about which services are
provided—the disclosure in no way impacts the content of the centers’ ideological speech.
In summary, a more nuanced analysis of the pregnancy service
centers’ speech leads to the conclusion that the New York City and
Baltimore disclosure laws apply to commercial speech.
5. Zauderer’s Rational Basis Test
Before considering how Zauderer’s rational basis test would apply
to Baltimore’s and New York City’s laws, it is necessary to consider the
requirement discussed in Part IV that the disclosure compel factual
rather than normative speech. Although the disclosures informing
women whether a medical professional is on staff and whether certain services are provided compel purely factual statements, the third
disclosure required by New York City’s ordinance compels normative
speech. The third disclosure, which requires the centers to disclose
that the New York City Department of Health recommends that

357
358

See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-816.
Id.
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women who are or may be pregnant consult a licensed medical pro359
vider, requires pregnancy service centers to act as a billboard for
the city’s normative message about how pregnant women should be360
have. While the disclosure explicitly indicates that the recommendation comes from the New York City Department of Health, and
thus does not require the centers to present the recommendation as
though it is their own opinion, this disclosure still interferes with the
centers’ autonomy interests by forcing the centers to spread the gov361
ernment’s message.
As a consequence, New York City’s third disclosure falls outside of Zauderer, and should be subject to Central Hudson’s intermediate level of scrutiny.
Rational basis review does apply, however, to the ordinances’ remaining disclosure requirements. In contrast to the visual tobacco
labels, these compelled disclosures are purely factual: they require
the centers to disclose which services are provided, and in the case of
New York City, whether a medical provider is on staff. Informing
women what services are provided at a pregnancy service center does
not require the centers to spread any type of normative government
362
message as their own.
Both New York City’s and Baltimore’s laws
are rationally related to each city’s interest in curing consumer deception and confusion about the scope of services that these centers
provide, thus meeting even a narrow reading of the permissible state
363
interests under Zauderer.
The Southern District of New York, in
359
360

361

362
363

!

Id.
Here, the normative nature of this speech is evident on the face of the disclosure. Accordingly, there is no need to look to the government’s purpose in mandating the disclosure.
For example, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977), it was equally clear that the
state motto on New Hampshire’s license plates was a mandated state message, and not
the opinion of individual drivers. Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the
format of state license plates is “known to all as having been prescribed by the State”).
The requirement that the plaintiffs display the license plate, however, still offended their
autonomy interests by requiring them to “use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message . . . [and] display ‘Live Free or Die’ to hundreds of people each day.” Id. at 715. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995) (“[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to
one’s own is forced upon a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over the message is compromised.”).
Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. New York, 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (characterizing New York City’s law as mandating “only factual disclosures”).
Moreover, as the Southern District of New York recognized, deception is not the only value at stake. The disclosures serve the city’s significant interest in protecting public
health: “the prevention of deception related to reproductive health care is of paramount
importance. Lack of transparency and delay in prenatal care can gravely impact a woman’s health.” Id. at 207. Thus, given the discussion in Part III of the broad range of state
interests justifying compelled disclosures, the city’s interest in informing women in the
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fact, recognized the extent of the centers’ deceptive practices:
“[p]laintiff’s categorical denial of the existence of any such deception—and refusal to acknowledge the potential misleading nature of
364
certain conduct—feigns ignorance of the obvious.” Once the principles of the compelled commercial speech doctrine are applied to
the pregnancy service center disclosure laws, the laws’ constitutionality is easily established.
Given that the commercial speech doctrine seeks to protect the
informational interests of its audience, the definition of commercial
speech should not rely solely on the intentions and motivations of the
speaker. The analysis of the context and content of the pregnancy
service centers’ speech demonstrates the need to engage in a more
searching inquiry in determining what qualifies as commercial
speech in order to ensure that the pertinent interests are being
served.
CONCLUSION
Although information disclosure policies have proliferated over
the past twenty-seven years, the Court has given little consideration to
the scope of Zauderer. If rational basis scrutiny only applied to compelled commercial speech that (1) proposes a commercial transaction, and (2) cures consumer deception, a large number of disclosures would violate the First Amendment. My proposed test, which
requires a more nuanced analysis of what qualifies as commercial
speech, and which recognizes the breadth of state interests justifying
compelled speech as well as the distinction between factual and normative speech, sets forth a more workable method for analyzing the
First Amendment implications of compelled commercial speech.
The recent developments in the case law illustrate the inability of
the current doctrine to provide the lower courts with the tools to balance speakers’ First Amendment rights against the state’s substantial
interests. On one side of the spectrum, we see completely factual disclosures informing women about the types of services provided at a
clinic targeting pregnant women being enjoined simply because the
clinics do not charge a fee for their services. If these clinics were forprofit institutions charging a fee, the disclosures would raise few First
Amendment concerns. On the other side, we have gruesome images
of the consequences of tobacco addiction being injected into the very

364

interest of public health could serve as an independent basis for the disclosure requirements.
Id. at 208.
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essence of commercial speech: the sale of a commercial product.
And in the middle, we have factual disclosures about the presence of
mercury and the number of calories in restaurant foods being challenged because the disclosures do not target deceptive and misleading speech. As disclosure laws become an increasingly popular regulatory tool, courts will be forced to evaluate the First Amendment
values implicated by compelled commercial speech, with little direction from the Supreme Court. Although rational basis scrutiny assuredly is not always the appropriate level of scrutiny, this Article has
demonstrated that First Amendment values are in fact protected and
served by an extension of Zauderer’s framework to other factual scenarios.
There are important limits to this doctrine, and this Article has
highlighted one such limit on the type of speech that can be compelled. Another limit is the type of speech that can be required to
carry such disclosures. Zauderer only applies to commercial speech—
while this Article has argued for a more contextual, multi-factored
definition of what constitutes commercial speech, the rational basis
test assuredly does not apply to state laws compelling a doctor to give
certain information to his patient during the course of medical
365
treatment, or to laws that impose disclosure requirements on religious or political speech. The limits on compelled speech outside of
the commercial speech arena are beyond the scope of this Article,
but further analysis is certainly warranted given the increasing proliferation of state laws mandating physicians to give certain information, arguably ideological information, to women getting abor366
tions.
Such compelled speech requirements, which affect the
actual practice of the profession rather than just the offer of professional services, raise different First Amendment concerns beyond
367
those protected by the commercial speech doctrine.
365

366

367
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See Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 53, at 23 (“Although the
communication between a professional and her client might concern commercial matters, its regulation would almost certainly not be conceptualized as an issue of First
Amendment commercial speech doctrine. This suggests that we should distinguish between ‘impersonal’ communications that sustain a public of independent strangers, and
‘personalized communications’ that constitute particular relationships of dependence.”).
See Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 63 (discussing the First Amendment issues
raised by a South Dakota statute requiring physicians to inform women contemplating an
abortion that the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being, and that an increased risk of suicide and suicide ideation is a known medical
risk of abortion).
See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 83, at 784 (“The Central Hudson standard . . . does not
limit the justifications for restrictions on commercial speech to the prevention of deception.”). I evaluate the First Amendment issues raised by compelling physicians to engage
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in the state’s ideological speech in another academic project. See Keighley, supra note
229.

